Commonwealth v. Hunt by Nelles, Walter
COMMONWEALTH v. HUNT 
This article will survey a landmark of American labor law. It will 
be prefaced by a short recapitulation of general views which have been 
developed at length in another article.' 
The handful of American labor cases before 1850 are striking illus- 
trations of the nature of some law as an index of social direction-an 
index less like a compass showing direction in relation to some fixed 
lodestar of human harmony than like a weather-vane-harder to read, 
however, since the true direction of the wind it swings to is not always 
clear. Each of the cases showed a complex force resulting from the 
moment's collisions of an heterogeneous variety of wills, wants, inter- 
ests and values which it is convenient, though over-simple, to conceive 
as two opposing sets, each set more consistent than such a hodge-podge 
as distracts a normal individual or political party, one set describable as 
Tory and the other as Jeffersonian. Most of the cases showed Tory 
pressures as strongest, though the Jeffersonian always modified them 
and sometimes prevailed. 
The economically successful or adventurous tend, with exceptions, 
whatever their politics, towards the Tory position that such welfare as 
social inferiors may enjoy depends upon social superiors, to whom, 
therefore, submissive loyalty is due. This position, like its Jeffersonian 
opposite, may be supported by irrefutable evidence and be held by people 
who are intelligent and humane. It was almost universally held by such 
people in the Middle Ages.2 And powerful and penetrating minds 
(Hobbes, for instance, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, John C. 
Calhoun; in our own time, some among the many who are leaning 
towards Fascism), seeing that modern social theories have also failed 
to produce a world in which satisfactory living is more than conceptually 
normal, have concluded that the best hope for society, bad though it may 
be, lies in submission to superior power. Though my own bias is 
Jeffersonian, I use the word Tory to describe, not to disparage. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, that word was opprobrious in 
the United States. Toryism remained vigorous notwithstanding. But in 
law, politics and economics, it was driven under cover. In labor cases 
it hid behind concepts from the Jeffersonian stock: the rights of man, 
the equal liberty of individual men, laissez faire. The root question in 
these cases was always the same: whether workmen in combination 
should be permitted to obtain benefits which were beyond their several 
1 See Nelles, The First American Labor Case (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 165. 2 See TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1926). 
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reaches. To benefit its members, a labor union must variously coerce; 
to stand out against a strong union, if possible at all, is unpleasant, per- 
haps dangerous; members join and employers concede demands because, 
as a practical matter, they must. It was easy to base a speciously Jef- 
fersonian case against a union upon its coercive acts and tendencies.3 
The case was premised upon the illusion that freedom both can be and 
is absolute, and has a determinable boundary wall-the equal freedom 
of others. Individual workmen have liberty to do as they please. But 
when by combined refusal to work with another workman, they coerce 
a master not to hire or to discharge him, they invade the equal liberty of 
that master or of that workman.4 
Such argument had no room for a weighing of the benefits of an 
effective labor union to its members against its detrimental effects upon 
employers and strike-breakers. But since it employed concepts to whose 
currency Jefferson had contributed, it satisfied or silenced many nomi- 
nal democrats whose Jeffersonianism was only skin-deep. True Jeffer- 
sonians it did not satisfy, though it sometimes perplexed. Their feeling, 
though efforts to express it were usually bungling after doctrines of 
natural rights and equal liberty had been turned against them, was for 
freedom in fact-which depends upon power, and involves getting 
as well as pursuing enough economic security to nourish self-respect 
and permit at least an occasional self-respecting self-indulgence. They 
believed in laissez faire because they thought that more people would win 
through to relative freedom and satisfaction under a law chary of inter- 
ference with their efforts than under nagging restrictions. Constitu- 
tional checks and balances were to keep government at a minimum, as- 
suring laissez faire. And when, as was seen to be inevitable under this 
system, enterprising and highly endowed, or unscrupulous, individuals, 
pursuing economic advantage, should win oppressive superiorities of 
power, it was expected that less powerful individuals, let alone by law, 
All the known cases which preceded that which is the subject of this article 
are summarized infra in an Appendix, and will be cited in the article by the num- 
bers given them in the Appendix. Examination of the Appendix will show that 
the argument stated above in the text was the invariable mainstay of prosecution. 
4The terms which an employer will offer and a workman accept are affected 
but slightly by the free will of either. But the philosophers, judges and business 
men of the absolute-liberty-bounded-by-the-equal-liberty-of-others school were 
blandly unperturbed either by the frequency with which the words "free" and 
"coerced" are interchangably descriptive of the same concrete act or by the fac- 
tual impossibility of the enjoyment of equal freedom by A and B when they are 
unequal in power. One of the ablest of them could seriously assert, in substance, 
that under a statute providing that any five persons might form a water supply 
corporation, a coal heaver was as free to do so as Leland Stanford. Field, J., dis- 
senting in Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 356, 4 Sup. Ct. 
48, 52 (1884). A delightful demonstration of the emptiness of the concept that 
liberty is absolute and equal is by MAITLAND, Mr. Herbert Spencer's Theory of 
Society in 1 COLLECTED PAPERS (1911) 247. 
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would devise means to check and balance them. Combination is such a 
means. And consistency with Jeffersonian laissez faire would have 
required that labor unions be let alone by law to become an effective 
check upon the rising power of industrial entrepreneurs. 
Of course oppressions would not have ceased or freedoms have be- 
come equal in industrial society. Jeffersonians misstated their own aims 
when they so stated them. The real Jeffersonian aim was simply that 
more living should become more free and more satisfying, without 
sacrifice of human excellences which competition stimulates and hope- 
lessness of success stifles. Intelligent supporters of the labor side 
expected that such would be the result or tendency if organized wage- 
earners were let alone to make effective use of their combined power in 
competition with that of employers and unorganized wage-earners. 
Society would remain competitive, and instances of oppression and de- 
feat would still be incident to the rough-and-tumble. Labor power, like 
employers' power, would become tyrannous if it could. But it was 
devoutly believed that law could not compete with nature in providing 
checks upon economic tyranny. In fact the natural cure of labor tyranny 
was clearer than in other troublesome situations in which nature was 
thought to be self-correcting:5 if higher wages were exacted than the 
traffic would bear, the traffic would diminish, and unemployment would 
break up the labor union. 
Jeffersonianism, never quite coherently articulate, opposed Toryism 
concealed in borrowed concepts in twenty known labor cases before 1850. 
The series began in 1806 with the Philadelphia Cordwainers' case, where 
Toryism shakily prevailed in a nominally Jeffersonian community and 
court.6 It ended in 1842 with Commonwealth v. Hunt,7 a seeming vic- 
tory of Jeffersonianism in a Tory state and in the court dominated by 
the great but far from Jeffersonian Chief Justice Shaw. This paradox I 
shall undertake to explain. 
I 
A good deal of haze dimmed my picture of the fact situation in and 
behind Commonwealth v. Hunt until I obtained a transcript of manu- 
script notes of the testimony at the trial made in the court room by the 
5 "It would, I grant, be impossible for employers in any branch of manufac- tures to produce a permanent depression of wages, because others would find it their interest to embark in the business on more liberal terms .... The compe- tition of interest must inevitably break up every combination of the kind." Gibson, 
J., in Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Appendix, Case 6. 
6Considered in Nelles, supra note 1; noted briefly, Appendix, Case 1. TThe defendant's trial and conviction in the Municipal Court of Boston are 
reported in Thacher's Crim. Cas. 609 (1840); the reversal and arrest of judgment in 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 111 (1842). 
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defendants' counsel, Robert Rantoul, Jr.8 The published report of the 
trial left it open to suppose that the case was like most other labor 
cases,-that an influential body of employers had instigated and backed 
legal proceedings to crush a striking labor union. Economic depression 
had, however, virtually wiped out the strong labor movement of a few 
years earlier,9 and it was hard to see how there could have been an 
aggressive union at Boston in 1840. Rantoul's notes, with their gaps 
and obscurities repaired from other sources,10 clarify the case. 
The Boston Journeymen Bootmakers' Society was organized in 
1835. It was local to Boston. Its members worked only in one branch 
of the much ramified footwear industry, the making of a standard sort 
of high-grade boots. The pay in 1835 was $1.50 a pair. The years 
1835 and 1836 saw wild currency inflation by the state banks following 
Jackson's destruction of the Bank of the United States. The cost of 
living was mounting rapidly." In 1835 the newly organized Boston 
bootmakers raised their pay, by striking, to $1.75 a pair; in 1836, again 
by striking, to $2.00. In the depression following the Van Buren panic 
of 1837 the Society survived, but with reduced vitality. There were no 
further strikes for better wages; $2.00 was still the rate in 1840, less 
twenty-five cents for "findings" if the master furnished them, and an- 
other twenty-five cents for shop room unless the journeyman worked 
at home. And the standard of quality had so increased that a man who 
could make five pairs a week in 1835 did well to make four in 1840.12 
8Acknowledgment of my profound gratitude is due to Rantoul's grand- 
daughters, the Misses Harriet and Edith Rantoul of Salem and Beverly Farms, 
who allowed me to examine these notes and other manuscripts and pamphlets pre- 
served in Rantoul's file of the papers he used in Commonwealth v. Hunt. The 
inaccessibility of the Rantoul notes in print has required that the exposition should 
include verbatim, usually in footnotes, everything in them which is not obviously 
trivial, merely cumulative, or hopelessly unintelligible. 
91 COMMONS AND ASSOCIATES, HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1918) Part iii, by Edward B. Mittelman. This work will be cited simply as 
COMMONS. All references are to its first volume. 
0 Except for sparing addition of punctuation obviously called for, my liber- 
ties with Rantoul's notes (some of which are by his partner, John S. Kimball) 
consist of inserts necessary to completeness or coherence. These inserts are in- 
dicated by brackets; authority is cited for all inserts except the merely formal. 
The sources from which Rantoul's notes have been supplemented and corrected 
are: 
The report of the trial by Judge Thacher, who presided. This will be cited 
as THACHER. 
Detailed reports in the Boston Advertiser (Whig) of Oct. 23, 1840 (reprinted 
in the Semi-Weekly Advertiser of Oct. 24), and the Boston Morning Post (Demo- 
cratic) of Oct. 21, 1840. 
Brief items in these and other Boston papers of the fortnight in which the 
case was news. 
None of the reports is stenographic. 
" COMMONS, at 348-350. 
12 Details of this wage and strike history from Rantoul's notes (cf. THACHER, 
at 616-7): 
"DENNIS HORNE. Some of them got it up and I joined. We struck for 
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Though the Society did not prevent the employment in Boston of a good 
many non-members in its members' branch of the trade, it remained 
strong enough to prevent non-members as well as members from work- 
ing below its wage scale. 
The prosecution in 1840 of seven leaders of the Society resulted 
from a squabble with a willful journeyman named Jeremiah Home. 
Horne had been a member ;13 his troubles with the Society seem to have 
commenced when he did extra work on a pair of boots without charging 
for it. The Society imposed a fine, but "took it off" when his master, 
Isaac Wait, paid Horne at the regular rate for the extra work.14 Horme 
continued, however, at outs with the Society, which undertook to fine 
him for another infraction. Wait testified, according to Rantoul's 
notes: "I offered him the dollar and advised him to pay it. He said he 
shouldn't do it." Friction continued, until finally the Society was de- 
manding that Home "sign the rules" and pay, before re-admission to 
membership, "fines" aggregating $7.00 itemized as follows: "one dollar 
for going off with the books; fifty cents as an initiation fee; fifty cents 
for the breach of a rule; and five dollars for slandering the Society."15 
Wait, having been "told of the trouble," advised Horne to pay and 
join; and when Horne refused, Wait discharged him. Home laid a 
complaint before the District Attorney, and then sent his cousin Dennis, 
who was a member, to see the leaders of the Society-most of whom, 
like the Homes, were probably Irishmen16-and "settle with them." 
Rantoul notes that Dennis testified: 
"They said they wouldn't give three cents to settle. They asked if Home was 
going to prosecute. [Dennis replied]: Yes. Lawyer said sue if another 
would join! [Woods said]: 'I suppose if we give him $100 he would settle 
it.' I said he wanted nothing but his rights. O'Neal asked me if I should be 
a witness. I said I was as deep in the mud as they were in the mire. [O'Neal 
$1.75; we had $1.50 a pair. Since that we struck for $2.00. To raise the prices was 
my objects. The employers did sign. I made on an average-count them 5 pair. We put more work into them [now]. I cannot make 4-sometimes none. 2 pair a 
week. I couldn't mean I ever made 4 pair since. 
"ISAAC WAIT. When they begun, they wanted me to sign a paper. I said 
I would pay the wages, I didn't like to sign. No threats. They kept on work. 
. . .The wages were not unreasonably high. Provisions were rising both times. 
The work is done enough for it better. 
"DAVIS HOWARD [employer]. Fall of 1835, $1.50 a pair. 5 pair then. 
Prices rose. 4 pair now. Work is done considerably better. 
"JOHN J. DUNHAM. I employ three men. Wages not high. Can make 
four pair a week. 25 cents for shop room. 25 cents finding. Provisions rose in 
1835-$1.50 to $1.75; in the fall of 1836, $2.00. The work is better done." 
"Boston Semi-Weekly Atlas, Oct. 17, 1840. 
14THACHER, at 615. Cf. Rantoul: "WAIT. [Horne was] fined for stitching 
rands. I did allow him the pay, and his fine was taken off." "s THACHER, at 615. 
16 The defendants' names: John Hunt, Patrick Hayes, Daniel O'Neal, Supplier 
Woods, Michael O'Connor, Edward Farrington, John Odiorne. 
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then observed that Dennis was a G d . Others interrupted 
with 'Shut up! Let him alone! What is the use of talking?'] I said they 
had fined the wrong man. [Nothing was done at the time.]"" 
Shortly afterwards, early in October, 1840, Dennis attended a meeting 
of the Society. Rantoul thus notes his account of it: 
"[They] asked if I had been before grand jury. They asked me to retire, 
Dee did. I said I wished to see the last of every meeting. One said hoped 
never. Shout: 'Heave him down stairs! Kick him out!' Mr. Odiorne moved 
to adjourn, and do no business. I said I would go out. I told Odiorne it would 
look well before the grand jury. He said Parker had a long head and would 
question me pretty tight." As I was going down stairs, one of them said, 'He 
is kicked out!' Says I, 'Do you hear that? They said they would leave the 
hall to me.' Did not do violence to me. No one struck me." 
It seems clear, both from positive implications of the testimony and 
from the absence of any contrary suggestion in any of the reports, that 
there was no strike or threat or thought of a strike in 1840; no differ- 
ence or friction whatever between masters and journeymen, or the 
Society; and that the prosecution was instigated single-handed by 
Jeremiah Home. District Attorney Samuel D. Parker,19 however, took 
up the case with zeal. 
The indictment, found October 8, 1840, within a few days of the 
meeting from which Dennis withdrew, charged luridly in many counts 
that an effective labor union was a criminal conspiracy to oppress and 
impoverish employers and non-conformist workmen.20 The trial com- 
menced on October 14, and was concluded on October 22. The main- 
stays of the prosecution's case were the paper constitution of the 
17 The two inserts are from the report in the Post. 
18THACHER, at 616, puts "It will look well before the grand jury" into 
Odiorne's mouth instead of Dennis', thus reversing the implication. 
19 District Attorney Parker had been appointed in 1832 by Governor Levi 
Lincoln. He was of the Boston Brahminical caste, a son of the Rt. Rev. Samuel 
Parker, rector of Trinity and Bishop of Massachusetts. See Mass. Hist. Soc'y, 
clippings of obituary notices of Charles H. Parker from Boston papers of April 
9-12, 1908. 
20 Washed of the color imparted by the rhetorical verbiage which is still con- 
ventional in criminal pleading, the charges were that the defendants agreed not 
to work for any master who, after notice to discharge, should continue to employ 
any workman who was not a union member, or who had broken any union by-laws 
and not paid a sum to the society as penalty; and that by means of this agreement 
they compelled Wait to discharge Home. The first count charged a bare agree- 
ment; the second added its effect on Home; the other three merely varied the 
description of intention to conform with the formula of Serjeant Hawkins [see 
Nelles, supra note 1, at 196], the third and fourth stating it as to "impoverish" 
Home "by indirect means," the fifth to "impoverish" Wait, Blanchard, Howard 
and divers other employers unknown. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 7, 
4 Metc. at 112, 113, 114, 115. The indictment is more fully set forth there than in 
THACHER. 
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Society21 and the "oppression" of Jeremiah Horne and his employer 
Isaac Wait. There was no definite evidence that Home had suffered 
otherwise than in his feelings.22 Wait testified that though he "did not 
a Rantoul's papers include a pamphlet copy of this constitution, stated on the 
title page to have been adopted Oct. 12, 1835 and printed in 1837. Thacher's re- 
port prints extracts. 
The preamble recites that "we, the journeymen bootmakers of Boston, believ- 
ing it to be a duty incumbent upon us to adopt some measures in connection with 
our brother craftsmen of other cities and towns, in order to maintain that rate of 
wages which is necessary to insure us the necessaries of life, and believing too, 
that concentration of feeling and action is indispensable in effecting our wishes, do 
adopt the following constitution, pledging ourselves to be governed by and to sup- 
port it in all its bearings; provided always, in so doing, we do not act in opposi- 
tion to the laws of this commonwealth." 
The most important provisions in relation to the case were those of Article 14: 
"Any member working for a Society shop, and knowing a journeyman to be at 
work for the same who is not a member of this society, shall immediately give 
notice to the other journeymen, who, on receiving such information, shall quit 
work for that shop; provided, such shop shall have a majority of society men on 
work, but if their number be less, they may continue until work can be obtained 
elsewhere." 
In the following summary of other provisions stressed at the trial I have in- 
cluded Rantoul's notes of the district attorney's observations respecting them: 
"PARKER. Printed book gives objects. Preamble, not oppose laws, does 
not excuse them if they do break laws. Jury judge the law. If ignorant of law, 
this does not shield them.-Anti-republican, tyrannical, illegal, despotic. 
"Art. 8, sec. 3 [The standing committee, on pain of a fifty cent fine, shall 
invite all non-member journeymen in the city to join] ; Art. 13, sec. 1 [If a journey- 
man does not join by the second meeting after he has been invited, he must pay 
$2.00 instead of the usual fifty cent initiation fee before he can join later] ; He is a 
slave! Art. 13 is despotic. 
"Art. 10, sec. 1 [The duty of the Board of Judges shall be to decide all dis- 
putes between employers and journeymen, and lay such decisions before the 
Society, to be enacted upon as may be thought expedient.] You must submit to 
this decision. What is expedient! Not what is right.-Laws should settle dis- 
putes. By such rules for their selfish objects they take away trial by jury. Sec. 2 
[The same board, when called upon, shall determine what journeymen are first 
rate workmen, and every first rate workman who works at second rate wages shall 
be fined fifty cents for each offence.] A slave! Despotic, tyrannical, illegal, etc. 
Invasion of the liberty of the subject. Gross violations of right. Is there any such 
bar rule? 
"Art. 12, sec. 1 [Only persons of approved moral character shall be admitted 
into the Society.] It is hard that a man who has been in prison or a drunkard- 
[should be forbidden to work]. Any [such] bar rule? 
"Sec. 2 [Each member shall pay dues of 12I cents a month.] Payment in- 
voluntary. Thomas Rimmer is an unwilling member. Oppressive. Illegal tax. 
"Sec. 3 [The funds of the Society may be used, with the approval of two 
thirds of the members, to assist any member who may be ten days on a strike.] 
Strike-instead of one blue Monday, they have ten together. 
"Art. 16 [Any member proved to have been concerned in scandalous proceed- 
ings whereby the reputation of the Society may be injured, or to have endeavored 
to injure or defraud the Society, shall be fined $5.00.] Fine, not tried by jury, an 
extortion. 
"Art. 17 [The Society shall not be dissolved while five members wish it to 
continue; should it be reduced to ten, a member who wishes it dissolved may call 
a special meeting; but if five wish it to continue, he shall be fined $2.00.] 495 leave, 
5 oppressive men will hold on out of 500!" 
2 He was not permitted to testify; see note 25, infra. There was no evidence 
that he found employment harder to get than formerly, or took lower wages, ex- 
cept that Rantoul notes that Dennis testified Jere "could get no employment." 
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feel at liberty to employ any but society men," because he "would not 
wish to lose five or six good workmen for the sake of one," he "had not 
been injured or impoverished"; that wages fixed by the society were not 
"unreasonably high" and "the society men were all good workmen."23 
The efforts of the prosecution to present the Home episode as part of a 
pernicious series of oppressions by the Society were not strikingly 
impressive.24 
Thacher omits this-probably because it was shown to be untrue. Wait was not 
asked whether Horne was a good workman. Rantoul's notes: 
"JOHN SCHAIER. Master. Employed Jere Horne 3 weeks; took him as 
soon as he left Wait. I think it was the 8th Sept. I hired Home. Never notified 
[by defendants to discharge him]. I dismissed him because I had not work for 
him. I do not ask if a man belongs. I pay what a man is worth. PETER 
ROONEY. I have worked with Jere Horne 5 or 6 months. He was not a steady 
workman. He often left work undone. He had two pair of shoes to make and 
he made one shoe. 
"We have no right to put in this: 'When he had work, he did not earn his board' 
Ruled out. John Callinan [and] Alexander Church would swear he did not work 
when he had work. Also Oren Faxon who now employs [him]." 
2THACHER, at 614-15. 
24 Rantoul's notes of witnesses called by the prosecution (classification and ar- 
rangement mine; bracketed inserts in WAIT, DENNIS HORNE and HOWARD 
from THACHER, at 614-17): 
Generalities as to the Society's control. "WAIT. Never had a strike in his 
shop. [Employed mostly members of the society.] I never was notified not to 
employ a man. They would tell me there was trouble. I would advise a man to 
comply, and he would. ... If there is a fine, I advise them to settle. Never 
notified by anyone of these men that there would be a strike. [Knew the rules 
of the society, and the consequences that would follow, if he should violate them.] 
Society men work for some, scabs for others. DAVIS HOWARD. Hires 5 to 8; 
society men. [Had had some trouble on account of the society. Did not feel him- 
self at liberty to employ any person who was not a member.] I have had notices, 
can't say from whom. I suffered nothing. I dismissed a man; can't say that was 
the reason. Society [men] first rate workmen. Wages are not unreasonably high. 
I have not suffered from it. Work has gradually improved. [The better work now 
done on boots is not the consequence of this combination.] JOHN AUGUSTUS. 
I have had no particular trouble. General trouble enough. I must sack or be 
sacked-the chart I go by. We guide our faith and works by it. It is our Revised 
Statutes. The wages are not too high. Wood worked for me and was not then a 
member. A committee came round. JOHN J. DUNHAM. I employ three men. 
I am not a member. I never had any difficulty nor paid a fine. I decline answering 
if I helped framing the constitution: I should implicate myself. I never dismissed 
a man for not belonging. Wages not high. The work is better done. Believe 
outs get as much as ins. Shops hire outs and I never heard of any difficulty. No 
violence used. I am benefited by the society. It [work] is 12V2% better. Morals 
of men improved. I never said this society hurt their employers. I never said it 
hurt journeymen. I never said 'Damn the society' nor kicked over a table. At 
the formation of the society I did not think it would be good. Of late, I thought 
it did good, since I went round among the journeymen and saw the decided im- 
provement in work and in the morals of the [men]." 
Troubles about particular workmen. "[WAIT. Heard Hayes, one of the de- 
fendants, say that John Cleary and William Cleary, who were each fined $3.00 
by the society, paid this penalty.] WILLIAM CLEARY. Never met with any 
trouble in my life from this society. Paid no fines. LEANDER M. ERL. Jour- 
neyman and master. I decline answering if I lost work by not belonging to this 
society because I might be prosecuted. I never lost work by not belonging or by 
not paying fine. Payne never dismissed me. ELIAS D. BLANCHARD. Has 
10 or 12; has had society men, and some not. I have had Rimmen and son 4 
or 5 years ago. He did not belong. I had 5 or 6 who did-all but 2. Farrington 
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Rantoul, true to professional conventions, made it as hard as he 
could for Parker to put in his evidence. Jeremiah Horne was excluded 
from testifying upon the ground that he was an atheist.25 The constitu- 
tion of the Society went in evidence over objection that its connection 
with the defendants, whose membership was not conceded, had not been 
shown.26 The prosecution probably gained more than the defense from 
[a defendant] gave me a written notice. I discharged the society men; I thought 
I would try how it would operate. Found Rimmen and son could not do my 
[work]. I advised them to join. They did. I had to discharge Strickland be- 
cause they would not work [with him]. Mr. Rimmen is a first rate workman. I 
paid him the same as I do members. RIMMEN. I signed my name to a list of 
names and paid a fee, 50 cents .... Compulsion compelled me to pay fines. [It is 
inferable that he probably said also that he joined unwillingly, to keep his job.] 
DAVIS HOWARD. In February and March last, Samuel Thomas worked for 
me, or his apprentice. Did not comply with rules, so Sylvan Whitney told me. I 
did not dismiss Thomas. Odiorne and Farrington [defendants] left my employment. 
The affair was settled with the society, and Od. and Far. went to work. JOHN 
FISKE. I employ 12 to 20. A man brought me a paper of rates and compelled 
me to sign it. In February or March I employed Sam'l Thomas. Mr. Gale said 
Thomas had not complied with rules; must settle up or they would leave. We 
told him Thomas was one of our best men. They would give him time to think 
of it. None of the defendants had anything to do [with] it. I told him it was a 
hard case in a free country. It was settled. I had no other trouble since 1835. 
SYLVAN WHITNEY. He is now a master; has been a journeyman. Never 
had difficulty in getting work [before joining?]. I worked for Mr. Howard. A 
man by the name of Thomas worked for Howard. It was stated by the secretary 
that Thomas had broken rules. I told Howard I wouldn't work if Thomas did. 
He refused at that time to give any definite answer. In two days I understood it 
was settled. He told me Farrington was satisfied. SAMUEL THOMAS. De- 
clines answering about the society. [Claims privilege against self-crimination.] I 
was invited to join, but not by either of the defendants. I never saw either of the 
defendants at a meeting. MICHAEL SCULLEY [an ex-member]. Worked for 
Howard. He told me he didn't like my work, and didn't want me any longer. I 
worked for Mr. Fiske, and he said my work would not answer. Odiorne and 
Farrington [defendants] worked for Howard, Hunt for Fiske. I have always got 
work since I left. Raessle [presumably his present employer?] not a society shop. 
He hires 5 or 6 men." 
5 When Horne was called to the stand, Rantoul objected and was allowed 
to prove his disqualification. Rantoul's notes: "JOHN CALLINAN. Frequently 
conversed with Home. I have heard him deny the existence of a Supreme Being. 
Believed in a God in a bucket of water. When he died, he expected to be thrown 
into a hole, and that would be the end of him, etc. PETER ROONEY. He said 
he did not think he was any more than dirt or clay. He said he didn't believe in 
any of their damned Relig. DUNN. I was with Home. He boasted he would 
[rather] have his life than a knife and two stones. He did not believe in Heaven 
or Hell. He seemed to always boast of his irreligion in the shop. He was a 
Catholic in his younger days. DENNIS HORNE. His cousin. I have seen him 
at Catholic Church. Don't know his religious belief. I have not been to church for 
six months. I have talked with him. Just for the sake of opposition like, and 
to keep up talk. Sometimes took one side, sometimes the other. JUDGE 
THACHER. He is excluded. S. D. PARKER [the district attorney]. Horne 
is the prosecutor. This spoils some 
Rimmen, Cleary and Dennis Home testified that each paid fifty cents initia- 
tion fee, signed a list or constitution, and was given a book. Other journeymen 
had no memory or claimed privilege against self-crimination when asked about 
signing or receiving a book. The pamphlet copy of the constitution identified by 
Dennis Horne as that which "they" gave him was received in evidence. There 
was doubtless testimony, though Rantoul's notes do not show that it was complete, 
that each of the defendants was present and active at meetings. 
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such tactics; Rantoul notes this as one of the major themes of the Dis- 
trict Attorney's summing up: "The shyness of admitting the fact is in 
wonderful contrast to the pretense that it is lawful." 
One of Rantoul's unsuccessful objections to the form of testimony 
by witnesses for the prosecution was aimed deeper than his merely ob- 
structive technicalities. This was the question to which his test objection 
was overruled: "Do you feel yourself at liberty to employ or hire any 
person you please, whether a member of the society or not?"27 The 
district attorney was allowed directly to ask for, and the witnesses to 
state, the conclusion that the Society's acts were coercive.8 Much, to 
be sure, could be said in favor of a law of evidence which would allow at 
a trial complete license to paint pictures in full color. Our theory that 
testimony must not include reactions to things seen and heard does not 
work. A competent trial lawyer not only can, but practically must-it 
is one of the skills his wage scale depends upon-deliberately violate and 
evade the prohibitive rules. And the by-play incident to demands for 
their enforcement often-perhaps usually-results in making partisan 
inferences and their connotations more contagious to jurors than if 
their expression had not been dramatized by a leap at or through in- 
efficient obstacles. For the juror's sympathy is with free expression; 
fact to him is not drab fact, but fact with the natural color imparted by 
his own interest and emotion. He sees himself in the place of the lawyer 
or witness who does not want to falsify in neutral language. The most 
drastic enforcement of the rules fails to blot out color spilled upon the 
fact picture before the rules can be invoked. But though such enforce- 
ment of the rules as is possible is insufficient to make them effective, to 
overrule objection to a particular violation is to magnify its power to 
make partisan feelings contagious. When, as in the bootmakers' trial, 
the court officially sanctions chromatic testimony, the juror is likely to 
feel that truth and justice have defeated an effort to obstruct them. 
It was true, of course, that the employers and journeymen who so testi- 
fied had been "compelled" by the Society to comply with its demands. 
27 From Rantoul's copy of the bill of exceptions (the files of the Supreme 
Judicial Court which would include the official copy are said by the Clerk of that 
court no longer to exist): 
"2nd. Elias P. Blanchard, a master bootmaker in Boston, was sworn and 
examined as a witness for the prosecution; and to the following question which 
was put to him by Mr. Parker for the Commonwealth, 'Do you feel yourself at 
liberty to employ or hire any person you please, whether a member of the society 
or not?' (meaning the society which was alleged to constitute a conspiracy), Mr. 
Rantoul objected, on the ground that it called for the opinion of the witness in a 
matter where, by no rule of law, such opinion could be given in evidence. But 
the Judge overruled the objection and the witness, in answer to the question, said 
'that he did not.' To which ruling of the court, and evidence of the witness, de- 
fendants entered their exception, and the same was allowed." 
28 See testimony of Wait and Howard in THACHER, at 615-16, and of Augustus 
and Rimmen, supra note 24. Under Fiske, Rantoul has "A man brought me a 
paper or rates, and compelled me to sign it." 
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But such words as "compel" and "coerce" connote unlawfulness. The 
tendency of the ruling which gave to conclusions of coercion the status 
of primary evidential facts was to eliminate from the case the question 
whether the coercion in which the society had indubitably engaged was 
justifiable. 
No substantial issue was on trial unless that was. And the court did 
not consistently exclude evidence relevant to it. Half a dozen masters 
called by the defense strengthened points that Rantoul had commenced 
making on cross-examination of those called by the prosecution; all testi- 
fied that they had been benefited by the Society; work was much better in 
quality than before the Society was organized; the men were steadier and 
"blue Mondays" had become infrequent; the wages fixed by the Society 
were moderate, and non-members as well as members could get them; 
only a few comparatively large shops29 were closed against non-mem- 
bers-who, if they were competent workmen, got employment in the 
smaller shops as easily and on the same terms as members, the Society 
raising no objection and making no trouble. To show that association 
for the promotion, inevitably coercive, of common interests is normal 
and proper, Rantoul called representatives of several professional and 
commercial organizations-the closest analogue being that of the Boston 
Bar, of which Judge Thacher, the District Attorney, Attorney-General 
Austin, Chief Justice Shaw and Daniel Webster were members. Its 
rules fixed minimum fees "as the lowest which we can reasonably and 
honorably receive," and forbade members "to advise or consult, or be in 
any manner associated" with any non-member attorney who should not 
have subscribed to its rules. The Boston Medical Association had some- 
what similar rules, and in addition a disciplinary committee at whose 
instance a physician had been expelled for associating with "scabs."30 
The Bar Association had dissolved itself in 1836-a time of excitement 
with respect to the Trades' Union31-and the prosecution contended that 
its successor organization was merely nominal; but Rantoul could argue 
that it merely substituted an equally efficacious gentlemen's agreement 
for formally definite obligations.32 
2No shop was very large. The masters who were not free to employ non- 
members were Wait, employing more than 6, Blanchard 10 or 12, Howard 5 to 8, 
Fiske 12 to 20. Those who hired whom they pleased were Whitney 2, Leach 6 to 
8, Field 2, Tyler 1 to 2, Smith 3 to 5, Schaier 2, Dunham 3. As to his own wit- 
nesses Rantoul's notes add nothing of consequence to what appears in THACHER, 
at 619-620. 
30 Cf. the Board of Judges provided for by the constitution, supra note 21. There 
was no evidence that this board existed or functioned. 
31 See infra, text above n. 88-97. 
3 According to Rantoul's notes the constitution of the later bar association 
expressed "an opinion that the following rates are proper" instead of expressly 
making it obligatory not to charge less. The range of its provision that members 
might be expelled for "ungentlemanly" conduct would seem at least as broad as that 
of the bootmakers' requirement that members be of "approved moral character." 
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Though this much evidence upon the question of justification was 
received without question, the court excluded other evidence which was 
equally relevant if that question was in the case. The legitimacy of the 
object announced in the preamble to the Society's constitution was not 
challenged:-"to maintain the rate of wages necessary to insure us the 
necessaries of life." But when Rantoul, to support argument that its 
organization and subsequent activities were reasonably necessary to 
effectuate that object, offered to prove the cost of living at the time of its 
organization, Judge Thacher ruled that the cost of living was irrelevant.33 
The main arguments of counsel and the judge's charge will be out- 
lined later. Except for these, the foregoing covers all that is collectible 
of what, in the court room, was put before the jurors who found the 
defendants guilty. Of course the case was tried out of court as well as 
in. The presidential campaign which resulted in the defeat of Van 
Buren by Harrison and Tyler was at its highest intensity. At the be- 
ginning of his closing argument the district attorney expressed the wish 
that the trial could have been delayed a month-until after election? 
Rantoul's notes of the last day of trial contain also the following: 
"Oct. 22, 1 1/2 A.M. Parker continued. S. J. C. [Supreme Judicial 
Court] final judges. 
"Remarks of a morning paper! 
"Ruled out." 
33 Bill of exceptions, supra note 27: 
"(lst.) After the jury were empanelled to try the issue divers witnesses were 
sworn and examined in support of the prosecution, and among others, Grant 
Leonard. [Rantoul's notes have only this after his name: 'I paid no fines. I was 
at no meetings. Defendants propose five questions. Ruled out.'] After having 
stated in his cross examination that he believed that the Society of the Boston 
Journeymen Bootmakers' was formed five or six years ago, the said Leonard was 
asked by R. Rantoul, Jr., Counsel for the defendents, 'What was the price of flour 
at that time?' To this question S. D. Parker, Esq., for the Commonwealth, 
objected, that the indictment did not allege against the defendants any charge of 
conspiracy for raising their wages, and therefore that the inquiry was wholly 
irrelevant to the issue of the trial. Mr. Rantoul, in answer to this objection, stated 
that it was shown by the preamble to the constitution of the society which had been 
read in evidence and is to be referred to as on file in any future proceedings in 
this or in the Supreme Judicial Court, that the object of the defendants, who were 
members of the same, in its formation, was to maintain that rate of wages which 
was necessary to assure to them the necessaries of life; and he contended that this 
was the true and only object of the association. Hence he inferred that it was 
competent for the defendants in their defence to go into the inquiry as to what 
was, at that time, the price of flour and of the other necessaries of life. But the 
Judge ruled that the prices of the necessaries of life were not relevant to the issue 
and therefore excluded the evidence. To which ruling of the Court the defendants 
entered their exceptions, and the same were allowed." 
In an opinion supporting this ruling the trial judge said that "as the defendants 
are not charged with conspiring to raise their wages" evidence of relation of wages 
to cost of living which "might be pertinent" (as showing justification?) to that 
charge was irrelevant. "Whether the object of the club was good or bad, can 
derive no light from an inquiry into the price of flour .... One crime [raising 
wages?] can be no justification for another." THACHER, at 638. 
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No confident conjecture as to the remarks in question results from a 
search of the Boston papers. All but the Post were ardently Whig, and 
their slant and emphasis were favorable to the prosecution. The Post's 
initial reaction had been similar; its brief item on October 9th stated that 
an indictment had been found against the bootmakers, and that their 
constitution subjected workmen who declined invitation to join their 
society to two dollars fine; "This is levying blackmail with a vengeance," 
was the comment. The Post of October 16th announced that "we have 
taken means to secure a report of the trial, for the purpose of publica- 
tion, when closed." The item continues: 
"We ought to state that the apparently obnoxious provision in the consti- 
tution of the bootmakers' society, upon which a censuring comment was made 
when the case was first mentioned in our report, has been completely mis- 
understood in consequence of a misprint in the article as it appears in the 
pamphlet." 
The "misprint" explanation was disingenuous.34 The true ground of the 
Post's rescission of its censorious construction was probably the fact 
that so important a Democrat as Rantoul represented the defendants. 
The Post's promised report of the trial was published October 21st, after 
the evidence had closed, but before the case had gone to the jury. 
Though the Post gave more space to the defense and less to the prosecu- 
tion than the Whig Advertiser, its report was objective; neither there 
nor in any of its briefer items except the early one above quoted did I 
note anything which the district attorney could have found useful or 
objectionable. 
The Advertiser's detailed report was not published until the trial 
was over. It had this in conclusion: 
"As this trial has apparently created some political feelings, it may be proper 
to remark that the jury was composed of gentlemen of both political parties." 
Feelings, "political" or not, would naturally have been warmest 
among bootmakers. Disinclination to incur their resentment seems as 
apparent in some of the witnesses called by the prosecution as friend- 
liness to the Society in others.35 Resentment towards the prosecution 
was not confined to members of the Society. One Michael Sculley testi- 
fied at the trial that he had lost two jobs, inferably because he had 
34 See Art. 13, sec. 1, supra note 21, reprinted in full, THACHER, at 611. 35 See notes 24, 26, and 28, supra. "I was invited to join," said one witness 
"but not by either of the defendants. I never saw either of the defendants at a 
meeting." The printer who printed the constitution "could not remember" with 
whom he had dealt. (From Rantoul's notes.) 
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ceased to be a member.36 After he had left court and, it was said, had 
fortified himself with drink, a non-member named Dowling reproached 
him for interfering with what was none of his business. Fisticuffs 
followed; Sculley had Dowling arrested, but later entered a nol. pros.37 
II 
The initial reaction of most Bostonians of native stock such as 
composed the jury38 was probably like that of the Post. Even in those 
who were party Democrats39 the dominant political feeling would 
naturally have been repugnance to Irish40 coercion of American masters 
to discharge workmen with whom they were satisfied. This feeling 
was doubtless heightened and rationalized by the district attorney's 
arguments and the judge's charge. Rantoul to be sure was always heard 
with attention upon any subject at whatever length he spoke. But it is 
unlikely that his arguments shook even momentarily the initial presump- 
tion of jurors as to the mandate of their Americanism. 
At least from the early moment of the trial when the court held 
that the defendants' needs had no bearing upon the criminality of their 
Society, it must have been evident to him that his one hope lay in the 
power of the jury to judge law as well as fact-a power then still, 
though grudgingly, conceded to be rightful.41 He argued law to the jury 
as if to a court-the published reports of his arguments at the trial and 
in the Supreme Judicial Court are, indeed, virtually identical.42 
A modern lawyer arguing such a case in an exceptionally en- 
lightened court might as his main point claim justification for the de- 
fendants upon this ground: The benefits incident to the efficient main- 
tenance of a closed shop by a labor union outweigh the harms. I do not 
6 Supra note 24. 
37 Boston Post, Oct. 26 and 27, 1840. 
38These were the jurors' names: Oliver C. Greenleaf, Jeffrey Richardson, 
Albert A. Bent, Andrew E. Belknap, John T. Quigley, Aaron Guild, Enoch H. 
Wakefield, Nathaniel N. Bates, William A. Brabiner, James C. Converse, Samuel 
Floyd, Henry K. Hancock. Boston Advertiser, Oct. 15, 1840. 
39A Whig liquor license law had been the burning issue in Boston until the 
presidential campaign of 1840 crowded it out. Opposition to it had made many 
Democrats and cost the Whigs the governorship for a year. 
40 Chief Justice Shaw's fairness at the trial of the Convent Rioters in 1834 won 
approval from the Catholic Bishop in which by no means all native born Bostonians 
had joined. CHASE, LEMUEL SHAW (1918) 216. " It was not until 1845, in Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10 Metc.) 263 
(1845), that Chief Justice Shaw undertook the annihilation of this "right" of the 
jury which he completed, almost in the teeth of the state constitution, in Com- 
monwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185 (1855). In a prosecution in 1839 
under the liquor license law, supra note 39, Judge Thacher had said that he "could 
not say that a juror had not a right in a criminal case to disregard the opinion of 
the court upon the law." Pamphlet, THE COMMON LAW AND JURY TRIALS, re- 
printing a series of articles which appeared in the Boston Post in Sept. 1839 (copy 
in Rantoul's papers). 
4' See note 7, supra. 
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doubt that conviction that this was true was the main motive of Rantoul's 
exertions. He came no nearer to stating it, however, than when he 
claimed that the moving purpose of the defendants' organization-to 
maintain wages high enough to assure them the necessaries of life- 
involved negation of the alleged purpose to oppress Home and Wait. 
He himself saw that this was unsatisfactory.43 But no lawyer of his 
time could have conceived that the policy question was legal. Had he 
argued that labor power strong enough to minimize labor sufferings in 
the competitive scramble is justified by its social usefulness, even though 
a sufficient power cannot be maintained without restricting the freedom of 
masters or of an occasional Jeremiah Home, he would have seemed 
guilty of professional impropriety. 
For no Holmes had as yet seen rights and wrongs as relative, or 
the boundaries between the lawful and the unlawful as broad penumbra. 
Every legal right or wrong had, conceptually, the sharp definition of 
day or night in the tropics, where no twilight connects them. In the 
sphere of torts and crimes, law was thought of as a body of prohibi- 
tions; whatever was not forbidden was lawful. The prohibitions were 
established, settled, known. They had been established by the consent of 
the governed. The governed had consented to no delegation of legisla- 
tive power; they kept it in their own hands, even though they necessarily 
exercised it through representatives. The agency of the courts was 
merely to enforce known laws; judicial legislation would be tyranny. 
Though all rightful power was bounded by the common good, that good 
required above all else that only the established, settled, and known be 
given effect as law; for otherwise society would incur the greatest of 
all evils, arbitrary power. Established rules must therefore be given 
effect, whatever the cost in social disadvantage.44 Argument of their 
inexpediency should be addressed not to courts but to legislatures. The 
legal question was always, what is the rule, never what rule would be 
for the common good. Though a supposed social advantage was often 
the horse with which a sagacious judge or advocate made his technical 
arguments move, it was necessary to hitch that horse behind, not before, 
the cart of legalism. This necessity often excluded one side of a case 
from presenting its considerations of social advantage. For a court did 
not have to weigh them. And unless the mind of the court were more 
43 On a slip of scratch paper among his notes he wrote that a proper main 
object is not necessarily exclusive of incidental unlawful objects. 
44It is to be noted that Marshall, the most legislative of judges, always repre- 
sented his constructions as compelled by the plain meaning and intent of constitu- 
tional provisions-as evinced, to be sure, by considerations of social advantage. He 
seems to have believed intensely, and not always in the abstract, that the judicial 
function was solely to execute, never to create. See Marshall, C.J., dissenting in 
Bank of the U. S. v. Dandridge, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90-116 (1827). 
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open than minds usually are, considerations which the court preferred 
not to weigh were apt to be treated as contraband. 
Benthamite realists, of whom Rantoul was one, dissented not at 
all from the conventional ideals. They dissented vehemently, however, 
from orthodox assumption that these ideals were realized in practice. 
Recognizing that society is actually regulated less by common consent 
than by superior power,45 most of them demanded that the greatest 
number vest themselves with superior power, and restrict the courts to 
ministry of known rules established by the greatest number for their 
greatest good. The actuality and variability of the judicial legislation 
which Rantoul found palpable in law46 did not lead him, as it has modern 
realists, to urge that legal uncertainty be conceded as inevitable, and 
wide doors opened for either the ideally candid47 or the humanly un- 
candid48 disposition of the "real question" of every case upon "true 
grounds." Rantoul's Benthamite aim was that the personal wills and 
social views of judges should be reduced to innocuousness by a complete 
code of rules so definite and certain as to allow no loop-hole for judicial 
legislation. Pending codification, courts were if possible to be kept 
from legislating where the common law was silent or uncertain. 
Consistently both with his Benthamism and with the professional 
conventions of the time-and also with the wise practical policy of not 
exciting Tory antagonisms further than was unavoidable-Rantoul re- 
lied in Commonwealth v. Hunt rather upon negation of claims that there 
was law against effective labor organization than upon affirmation of its 
social expediency. His arguments were not original. They had been 
45 "Law is the command of the sovereign" was the backward-looking formula, 
the truth of which they toiled up-hill to prove: for superior powers in society are 
complex, shifting, and often obscure. Jurists whose construction of Austinianism 
is absurdly literal find it easy to prove its absurdity; e.g. ALLEN, LAW IN THE 
MAKING (1930). ? Rantoul's notes for his argument show that he read to the jury part, probably 
including the following, of his oration at Scituate, delivered July 4, 1836. "How 
can that which is definitely settled and well known, be applied otherwise than as a 
positive and unbending text? It is because judge-made law is indefinitely and 
vaguely settled, and its exact limits unknown, that it possesses the capacity of 
adapting itself to new cases, or, in other words, admits of judicial legislation .... 
The law should be a positive and unbending text, otherwise the judge has an 
arbitrary power, or discretion; and the discretion of a good man is often noth- 
ing better than caprice. . . . Why is an ex post facto law, passed by the legisla- 
ture, . . . unconstitutional . . . while judge-made law, which, from its nature, 
must always be ex post facto, is not only obeyed, but applauded? . . . No man can 
tell what the common law is; therefore it is not law; for a law is a rule of action. 
. . .The judge makes law, by extorting from precedents something which they do 
not contain. . . . Almost any case, where there is any difference of opinion, may 
be decided either way. . . . We must have democratic governors, who will appoint 
democratic judges, and the whole body of the law must be codified." HAMILTON, 
MEMOIRS, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR. (1854) 278-281. 
'7 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
'Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process 
(1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 617. 
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ably presented by Franklin in 1806 and Sampson in 1810.49 They had 
been pressed unsuccessfully in a number of later cases. But Rantoul 
was probably the most powerful lawyer who has ever whole-heartedly 
defended an American labor case. His mind had depth and range; 
he inspired both liking and respect, even among those who differed with 
him; though he had not attained to a political position more impressive 
than that of minority leader in the state legislature, he was expected 
to.50 
His first point'after he had assured the jury that they were judges 
of law, was that there was no law against conspiracies in restraint of 
trade unless common law. There should be no such common law crime; 
it would be too uncertain. "Man makes law for his dog"; unless it is 
clear and simple, the dog does not know how to behave; he is not 
regulated, but confused. "Misera seervitus ubi jus incertum atque 
vagum." That criminality should depend upon ex post facto judicial 
legislation may be well enough in a stationary society like that of China. 
It is intolerable in a society where everything is changeful. 
"We have not adopted the whole mass of the common law of Eng- 
land, indiscriminately, nor of the English statute law." Our Constitu- 
tion continues only such as had been used and approved and usually 
practised before its adoption-only such, moreover, as suits the condi- 
49Appendix, Cases 1 and 3. 
50Rantoul, 1805-1852, was the son of another Robert Rantoul who was also 
well known for humane and liberal activities. At Harvard, Robert, Jr. "was 
chiefly instrumental in forming a society for literary exercises on a freer and more 
generous principle of election to membership than prevailed in the societies pre- 
viously existing. He effected the union of this association with two others of 
earlier date under the name of the 'Institute of 1770,' which was divided into 
several sections for the cultivation of general literature, chemistry, geology, and 
natural history." It would have distressed him to foresee that his college society 
was to depart somewhat from its original aims. 
After practicing law in Essex County with success, in spite of near-ostracism 
at the beginning for his democratic politics, and serving brilliantly in the legis- 
lature (where his main exertions were for penal reform, codification, and educa- 
tion, and against corporate "monopolies"), he shifted his office to Boston shortly 
before the bootmakers' case. After Dorr's Rebellion he was as obvious a choice to 
defend Rhode Island rebels as Daniel Webster to prosecute them. He was ap- 
pointed Collector of the Port of Boston in 1843 and United States Attorney in 
1844. Towards the end of his short life, somewhat inconsistently with his 
hostility to corporate privileges in Massachusetts, he lobbied through the Illinois 
legislature, against the opposition of Abraham Lincoln, the charter of the Illinois 
Central. Within a few months after his election to Congress in 1851 by a coalition 
of Democrats and Free Soilers, he died suddenly. 
His ideas and advocacies must be passed with such slight mentions as occur 
here and there in this article. Personally he was vivid; people cared for him 
deeply-though I suspect that Hawthorne, who was in politics only for jobs, may 
rather have cultivated than liked him. For Rantoul took his politics seriously. 
See HAMILTON, op. cit. supra note 46; M. E. Curti, Robert Rantoul, Jr. (1932) 
5 N. E. QUAR. 264; Stewart, Hawthorne and Politics, id. 237; 36 HIST. COLLEC- 
TIONS OF THE ESSEX INSTITUTE (1889) 34 ff.; 17 id. (1880) 159 ff.; 34 id. (1898) 
195; 21 id. (1884) 264 ff.; Robert Rantoul, Jr. (1850) 5 U. S. MAG. AND DEM. 
REV. 348; Robert Rantoul, Jr. in 3 SUMNER, WORKS (1875-1883) 76. 
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tions of a free people who have thrown off monarchy and the class 
discriminations that go with it. "We might as well be governed by 
England as to adopt blindly in mass her laws which grow out of her 
institutions and state of society." Her government is founded upon 
property. Her laws restraining laborers from interfering with trade 
sacrificed them to the ruling classes. "Laws against acts done in re- 
straint of trade belong to that portion of the law of England which 
we have not adopted. They were part of the English tyranny from 
which we fled. They are repugnant to the Constitution and to the first 
principles of freedom."51 
His further more technical arguments as to the law of conspiracy 
and criminal pleading, though they made no impression upon the trial 
court, were to such an extent adopted by Chief Justice Shaw, whose 
opinion will be discussed later, that they will not be stated at this point. 
He addressed the jury for two solid days, doubtless with warmth and 
color of which but few traces survive in his notes or the summaries in 
the printed reports. It seems fair to conclude, however, that most of 
what he said was better adapted to the understanding of an appellate 
court than a jury. The friendly Boston Post made no attempt to con- 
vey any of his points to the public, saying only that his argument was 
"most elaborate. ... As a review of the English laws respecting the 
working classes, it was one of the most instructive arguments ever made 
in Boston." The judge commenced his charge with the remark that the 
jury's patience had already been "well disciplined." The district at- 
torney commenced his closing argument by characterizing Rantoul's 
speech as suitable for a lecture hall or legislature; small part had any 
bearing on the case; but "a certain mystification has been thrown over 
it which I will try to disperse."52 
It does not appear that Rantoul tried directly to counteract the 
emotions which were likely to defeat him-sympathy with bootmakers 
who had to join or quit their jobs, and with masters who were forced 
to acquiesce; fear of labor tyranny. The district attorney and the 
judge, on the other hand, probably succeeded in heightening these 
emotions. When the introduction of machinery gave rise to trade unions 
in England, said the district attorney in his opening, "the utmost energy 
of the government was required for the preservation of the laws and 
the protection of the community." Such prosecutions as this are not 
new. The tailors of Cambridge were convicted in 1721;53 there have 
5 The above is taken mainly from the notes Rantoul used in making his 
argument, which consist of eight formulated propositions with a mountain of cita- 
tions under each; his more technical arguments are adequately summarized in the 
reports, supra note 7. 
52 Boston Advertiser, Oct. 23, 1840. 
3 See infra, note 64. 
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been many cases in this country, especially in New York.54 But there 
has been no difficulty in suppressing trade unions, "for their spirit is 
anti-republican, and public sentiment has aided the law in checking 
the mischief. .. . What can be more tyrannical than for the journey- 
men of any trade to combine and take preventive measures, that no man 
shall be employed in their trade, unless he pays them for admission into 
their society, and submits to their dictation and rules? No choice is 
allowed. There is absolute and over-bearing compulsion." It is true 
that lawyers have had bar rules, and physicians their tariff of fees. 
"But one conspiracy is no justification for another." When trade union 
societies began to be in vogue in Massachusetts, moreover, the Suffolk 
Bar set the good example of abolishing their rules regulating fees.55 
The bootmakers' society "may have some good objects, and do some 
good, . . . but it is oppressive . . . and intended so to be-a coercive, 
rigid, persecuting society." In this particular it differs from the bar and 
medical societies.56 
Judge Thacher's emotional appeals were less restrained: "You 
may have perceived in this case, as in other secret societies, the strength 
of the spirit of the society." Members were unwilling witnesses against 
it. But its constitution speaks for itself, and cannot be contradicted.57 
"You must judge whether they do not propose, by means of this 
league, to control all masters, journeymen, and apprentices in their art; 
and to compel the people of the commonwealth to pay for their boots 
and shoes whatever price this society shall set." If they are held justi- 
fied in law, "they will probably make new and still more burdensome 
regulations." And masters, under equal protection of law, will combine 
and oppress journeymen, till ultimately every profession, trade, and 
occupation will be "disfranchised of their ancient . . . rights and 
liberties, and subjected to new, secret, and unknown tribunals, and to 
varying laws by which their property will be taken from them against 
their consent, and without trial by jury." "The question is not whether 
the society have used their power to the extent of mischief of which 
it is capable, but rather whether they have not assumed a power . . . 
which in the hands of irresponsible persons, is liable to great abuse." 
If such associations should become general, "all industry and enter- 
prise would be suspended, and all property would become insecure. 
It would involve in one common, fatal ruin, both laborer and employer, 
and the rich as well as the poor. It would tend directly to array them 
54 He cited only the New York Cordwainers' Case and People v. Fisher, Ap- 
pendix, Cases 3 and 16. 
55 Boston Post, Oct. 21, 1840; cf. THACHER, at 614. 
THACIER, at 635, 653. 
57 Both the judge and district attorney dwelt upon provisions of the constitution 
concerning the operation of which there was no evidence. See note 21, supra. 
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against each other, and to convulse the social system to its centre. A 
frightful despotism would soon be erected on the ruins of this free 
and happy commonwealth."58 
Of course all this had a sub-structure of assertion as to the law. 
The jury's right to judge the law was conceded. They must do it upon 
evidence, however-expert evidence, since they cannot be expected to 
read "the hundred law books produced on each side." The court is 
the constitutional witness; they should not rely upon other testimony 
than his.59 The common law is as certain as statute law. That of this 
commonwealth rests not only upon that of England but also upon cases 
adjudged here since the Revolution. Our supreme court "have decided 
that conspiracy is an offence at common law, as adopted in Massachusetts, 
and by this decision and that of this court you must abide." The ob- 
ject of a conspiracy need not be an act criminal if performed by an 
individual; the conspiracy is criminal if the object is only civilly un- 
lawful.60 
"Although it was lawful for these defendants, individually, to refuse to work 
for any master bootmaker who should employ a journeyman not a member 
of their society, yet if they combined together to control, by the force of num- 
bers, the employment of other persons, or to extort from any one the payment 
of sums of money not justly due, I consider that both the means and the object 
were violations of law." 
They usurp governmental power. And that is unlawful; for the Con- 
stitution provides "that every individual in this commonwealth has a 
right to be protected by the government in the enjoyment of his prop- 
erty, according to standing laws." Their fines are taxes; and only the 
legislature may lawfully tax. "It is my duty to instruct you, as matter 
of law, that this society of journeymen bootmakers, thus organized for 
the purposes described in the indictment, is an unlawful conspiracy 
against the laws of this commonwealth."61 
After the verdict of guilty, imposition of sentence was deferred 
until the Supreme Judicial Court should have ruled upon Rantoul's 
exceptions. That court found it unnecessary to pass upon three of 
the four exceptions,62 since it sustained the fourth. The exception sus- 
tained was to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, 
58 THACHER, at 647, 650-654. 
59 Id., at 636, 640. 
60 Id., at 640-642, citing cases in 1803 of conspiracies to commit civilly actionable 
frauds which were not then indictable. 
61 Id., at 644-5, 648, 649, 650, 653. 
6a Exceptions not passed upon were to permitting witnesses to state conclusions 
of compulsion, supra note 27, to the exclusion of evidence of the cost of living, 
supra note 33, and to the exclusion of evidence that Home was habitually slack 
as a workman, supra note 22. 
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"that the indictment did not set forth any agreement to do a criminal act, or 
to do any lawful act by any specified criminal means, and that the agreements 
therein set forth did not constitute a conspiracy indictable by any law of this 
commonwealth."3 
Chief Justice Shaw's opinion was a consummate fusion of considera- 
tions of social advantage with technicality, adopting, with subtle modi- 
fications, all of Rantoul's contentions as to the law of conspiracy. 
The common law of Massachusetts, he said, derived from that 
of England the rule that it is criminal to combine to do that which is 
unlawful or criminal. But much that was unlawful or criminal in 
England is not unlawful in Massachusetts. Many English rules as to 
laborers, both statutory and at common law, were not adapted to our 
conditions and are not law here. Since we have no legal limits on 
wages, The King v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge64 is not a prec- 
edent for a prosecution here of a combination with the same object. 
The only other reported case of the eighteenth century in which a 
labor combination was held indictable at common law was Rex v. 
Eccles.65 The indictment there charged conspiracy, by means not stated, 
"to deprive and hinder" a tailor from exercising his trade; the court 
must have deemed this object unlawful, whatever the means by which 
it was to be affected; it is not so here. The only American labor case 
which seemed to Shaw worth mentioning was People v. Fisher,66- 
explainable on the ground that in New York, by statute, restraint of 
trade is a criminal object when it is the object of a combination. Such 
is not the law in Massachusetts. 
Shaw found his own abstract definition of conspiracy unsatis- 
factory. He agreed with Rantoul that the pattern conspiracy is a com- 
bination to commit a crime; the exception which his decision sustained 
was framed on that theory. Yet, respecting the authority of cases 
sustaining convictions for conspiracy to defraud or to seduce when the 
execution of the contemplated fraud or seduction would not have been 
a crime, he was forced to say that if the intended object or means, 
though not criminal, was unlawful, the combination might be a con- 
spiracy. "But yet it is clear, that it is not every combination to do 
unlawful acts, to the prejudice of another by a concerted action, which 
"6 Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 7, 4 Metc. at 127. 
48 Mod. 10 (K. B. 1721); the object of the combination was to raise wages 
higher than a statutory maximum. The case was badly reported or loosely rea- 
soned; but it seems to have been held that an indictment for conspiracy to do what is unlawful by statute need not aver contra formam statuti. 65 Leach, C. C. 274 (1783), an obscurely reasoned, loose decision of Lord Mans- 
field's. See Nelles, supra note 1, at 197 et seq. 
6Appendix, Case 16. The court in that case clearly purported to find that 
the statute was declaratory of the common law. 
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is punishable as conspiracy." The line defies precise definition by words. 
The specific object or means must be examined to see upon which side 
of it a case falls. 
Therefore an intended object or means that will stamp the com- 
bination a conspiracy must be specified in the indictment.67 Question- 
begging pleader's conclusions will not do.68 Nor will evidence at the trial 
repair their insufficiency. "Whatever illegal purpose can be found in 
the constitution of the Bootmakers' Society, it not being clearly set 
fourth in the indictment, cannot be relied upon to support this convic- 
tion. So if any facts were disclosed at the trial which, if properly 
averred, would have given a different character to the indictment, they 
do not appear in the bill of exceptions, nor could they, after verdict, 
aid the indictment. But looking solely at the indictment, disregarding 
the qualifying epithets, recitals and immaterial allegations, and confining 
ourselves to facts so averred as to be capable of being traversed and 
put in issue, we cannot perceive that it charges a criminal conspiracy 
punishable by law."69 
Having thus made a case for reversal with an old-style technical 
rigor which was not always characteristic of him, Shaw supplemented 
it with powerful argument on the merits.70 Under the indictment 
before him, the defendants could be punished for innocent, even laud- 
able, acts and aims. For stripped of pleader's conclusions, the charges 
are two: (1) that the defendants formed a society and agreed not to 
work for anyone who should employ a non-member after notice to 
discharge him;71 (2) that their object was to impoverish Jeremiah 
Home and certain masters. They may have done and intended all that 
is charged, and yet have done or intended nothing unlawful or improper. 
Their manifest purpose to induce all those engaged in the same 
occupation to become members of their society is not unlawful. "It 
would give them a power which might be exerted for useful and honor- 
able purposes, or for dangerous and pernicious ones. . . . Such an 
67 "When the criminality of a conspiracy consists in an unlawful agreement 
... to compass some criminal or illegal purpose, that purpose must be fully and 
clearly stated in the indictment; and if the criminality . . . consists in the agree- 
ment to compass . . . some purpose, not of itself criminal or unlawful, by the use 
of fraud, force, falsehood, or other criminal or unlawful means, such intended use 
of fraud, force, falsehood, or other criminal or unlawful means must be set out 
in the indictment." Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 7, 4 Metc. at 126. 
68 "This is required, to enable the defendant to meet the charge and prepare 
his defence, and, in case of acquittal or conviction, to show by record the identity of 
the charge, so that he may not be indicted a second time for the same offence." 
Id., at 25-6. 
69 Id., at 136. 
70 Id., at 128-136. 
71 Shaw recited the averment in the indictment of purpose to boycott work- 
men who would not pay fines levied by the Society for breach of its rules (id., at 
131), but without dignifying it by discussion. 
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association might be used to afford each other assistance in times of 
poverty, sickness and distress; or to raise their intellectual, moral and 
social condition." If, under cover of meritorious avowed objects, people 
associate for secret purposes "injurious to the peace of society or the 
rights of its members," it is undoubtedly a criminal conspiracy. Or if 
the leading spirits of an innocent association turn its powers to pur- 
poses of oppression and injustice, "it will be criminal in those who thus 
misuse it, or give consent thereto, but not in the other members." But 
no such criminal objects are averred. 
"Nor can we perceive that the objects of this association, what- 
ever they may have been, were to be attained by criminal means." The 
proposed means averred is not working for employers of non-members. 
Unless this involves breach of employment contracts,72 which is not 
to be supposed without averment, they are "free to work for whom 
they please, or not to work, if they so prefer. . . . We cannot perceive 
that it is criminal for men to agree together to exercise their own ac- 
knowledged rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their own in- 
terests." Test this by assuming an indubitably laudable object-the 
discouragement of intemperance-and means like that alleged-not to 
work for employers of habitual drinkers. Persistent drinkers would 
find employment hard to get or keep; employers would suffer by losing 
skillful but intemperate workmen. But "as the object would be lawful, 
and the means not unlawful, such an agreement could not be pronounced 
a criminal conspiracy." 
It was averred in one of the counts that "by means of said conspiracy, 
the defendants did compel one Wait to turn out of his employ one 
Jeremiah Home." If this could be construed as averment of an in- 
tended object or means,73 the question would be of the construction of 
the word "compel." It sometimes means "coercion, or duress, by force 
or fraud." With a context of averments of intended force or fraud, 
72"The case supposes that these persons are not bound by contract. . . . We 
do not understand that the agreement was, that the defendants would refuse to 
work for an employer to whom they were bound by contract . . ; nor that they 
would insist that an employer should discharge a workman engaged by contract 
for a certain time, in violation of such contract. ... If a large number of men, 
engaged for a certain time, should combine together to violate their contract, and 
quit their employment together, it would present a very different question. Sup- 
pose a farmer, employing a large number of men, engaged by the year, at fair 
monthly wages, and suppose that just at the moment when the crops were ready to 
harvest, they should all combine to quit his service, unless he would advance their 
wages, at a time when other laborers could not be obtained. It would surely be a 
conspiracy to do an unlawful act, though of such a character, that if done by an 
individual, it would lay the foundation of a civil action only, and not of criminal 
prosecution. It would be a case very different from that stated in this count." 
Id., at 130-1. 3 He thought it could not; if no criminal object is distinctly averred, inference 
from averments of overt acts cannot supply the defect. Id., at 132. 
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"especially if it might be fairly construed . . . that Wait was under 
obligation, by contract, for an unexpired term of time, to employ and 
pay Horne,"74 compel might have that meaning. But the word "is 
disarmed and rendered harmless by the precise statement of the means, 
by which such compulsion was to be effected. It was the agreement not 
to work for him, by which they compelled Wait to decline employing 
Horne longer." 
As to counts stating the defendants' object as "to impoverish" 
Horne or Wait by unstated "indirect means,"75 but little need be added. 
Suppose a baker had the exclusive custom of his village, and was mak- 
ing large profits; and some of his customers, when he would not re- 
duce prices, set up a competing bakery. "The effect would be to diminish 
the profit of the former baker, and to the same extent to impoverish 
him. And it might be said and proved that the purpose of the associates 
was to . . . impoverish him. . . . The same thing may be said of all 
competition in every branch of trade and industry; and yet it is through 
competition that the best interests of trade and industry are promoted." 
An association whose object is to adopt measures which may tend to 
impoverish is not criminal unless its contemplated measures are criminal 
or unlawful. 
These were the points of Shaw's opinion. Rantoul might have 
been dissatisfied with much that he said. Shaw was careful, it will 
have been noted, to leave open various doors through which, should 
occasions arise, law could move to break effective labor organizations. 
Yet the main points which earlier counsel in American labor cases had 
pressed in vain seemed established for good and all: that special un- 
lawfulnesses peculiar to labor organizations were not to be transplanted 
from England, and that whatever one person may lawfully do, any 
number may lawfully undertake, even if the result is to maintain the 
closed shop. These points were indeed regarded as established from 
1842 until after the Civil War. 
III 
To comprehend why Shaw thus overthrew the sub-structure upon 
which a Tory criminal law against labor organizations could respect- 
ably have been established requires consideration of much that was not 
in the record before him or touched upon in his opinion. He was no 
sentimental friend of the poor working man. A week or so, at most, 
before the decision of Commonwealth v. Hunt, he had breathed life 
into the fellow servant rule:76 if a locomotive engineer is injured by 
74Id. 
75 By enforcement of the closed shop rules, in fact. 
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co., 45 Mass. (4 Metc.) 49 (1842). 
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the negligence of a switchman, the railway company which employs 
both is not liable. Such a rule, he argued, "is founded upon the ex- 
pediency of throwing the risk upon those who can best guard against 
it." It will make for the protection of both the public and fellow work- 
men from injuries due to workmen's negligence. For, knowing that 
they cannot get compensation if injured, engineers, for example, will 
quit their jobs rather than work on the same railway with a careless 
switchman. Railways will discharge careless switchmen to prevent this. 
Therefore switchmen will be careful. Whatever the legal consistency 
of letting workmen help themselves against fellow servants in one case, 
and against employers and competing cheap labor in the other, incon- 
sistency between the two cases is at least as obvious from a Jeffersonian 
point of view. 
Shaw, though gruff, was a tender-hearted man.77 But he had no 
more liking for democracy or respect for the common man than Hamil- 
ton or Webster. At a time when an intelligent Jeffersonian could rea- 
sonably hope that juries would continue to correct judicial biasses and 
rigidities often and importantly enough to outweigh their frequent im- 
becilities, Shaw contributed greatly to depriving jury service of dignity 
and responsibility.78 Neither his greatness nor his conscientiousness as 
a judge is open to the slightest question. His conscience was Tory. 
The constituency to which his sense of obligation was keenest comprised 
State Street and Beacon Hill, the bankers, the textile manufacturers, 
the railway builders. With most of that constituency, he had shifted 
from Congregationalism to Unitarianism79-of the safe and sane variety 
which looked askance at the audacious social and religious views of 
Emerson and Theodore Parker.80 He was often bitterly denounced by 
radicals. For example Richard Henry Dana, whose abolitionist fervor 
laid him open to retort in kind, described Shaw as "a man of intense and 
doting biases in religious, politicial, and social matters."81 Though he 
spoke respectfully of "liberty," he was one of many judges who have 
found in "license" strict limits to the scope of that flexible concept. 
Abner Kneeland's "blasphemy" seems to have been an honest and sober 
77 CHASE, op. cit. supra note 40, c. xi. This work, with Professor Beale's 
short memoir in 3 LEWIs, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS (1907) 455, make it easier 
to get a personal impression of Shaw than of most other American judges even of 
comparable distinction. 78 See note 41, supra. 9 A line of his decisions, commencing with Stebbins v. Jennings, 27 Mass. (10 
Pick.) 172 (1830) also shifted church properties to the Unitarian seceders. 
8sIt may be evidence that he was tolerant of intellectual idiosyncrasy that Herman Melville, his son-in-law, dedicated Typee to him. 
81 CHASE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 216. Shaw sustained the Fugitive Slave 
Law against an attack in habeas corpus by Rantoul and Dana. Id., at 166. But he abhorred slavery. 
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statement of religious disbelief; but Shaw sustained his conviction.82 
When Rufus Choate admonished a professional colleague to remember 
that under Shaw "liberty and property are safe,"83 he meant the extra- 
ordinary and perhaps licentious degree of liberty which, since it de- 
pends upon successful acquisition, comparatively few can enjoy. Though 
"property" to Shaw was sacred, he did not conceive its immunities as 
absolute. He agreed with Taney, as against Marshall and Story, that 
a merely private interest must yield to interests in industrial expansion.84 
This policy would account more reasonably than the explanation he 
gave for his position on the fellow servant rule-also for his holding 
that a railway's insurer's liability ends when it has unloaded freight in 
its own depot.85 Railways had yet to establish themselves; and there 
was much feeling that capital needed encouragement to invest in them. 
He was liberal in the sense that another great Tory judge, Lord 
Mansfield, was liberal; his eyes were wide open to what was going on 
in the world; he was impatient of narrow legalism, well though he could 
use it; he wanted law to promote fair dealing in business transactions; 
he wanted enterprise to prosper; he was sagaciously alert to promote 
these and other interests which seemed to him to be those of the sup- 
posed entity called "society." Holmes wrote of him: "The strength 
of that great judge lay in accurate appreciation of the requirements of 
the community whose officer he was. Some, indeed many, English 
judges could be named who have surpassed him in accurate technical 
knowledge; but few have lived who were his equals in their under- 
standing of the grounds of public policy to which all laws must ulti- 
mately be referred."86 Holmes himself owes much to him. Shaw 
anticipated him, for example, when he said: "In considering the rights 
and obligations arising out of particular relations, it is competent for 
courts of justice to regard considerations of policy and general con- 
venience." The context in which Shaw said this, however, distinguishes 
him from Holmes-whose Toryism is greatly modified, much as John 
Adams' was, by Jeffersonian values. It was said as preface to Shaw's 
argument of the sound policy in the fellow servant rule. 
For all the meagreness of the bill of exceptions filed in his court, 
Shaw undoubtedly knew all that was worth knowing about the trial of 
82 Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838). 
83 CHASE, op. cit. supra note 40, at 289. 
4 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). Cf. Taney in 
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); in that 
case Shaw had as counsel in the Massachusetts courts argued for the side which 
would have prevailed had Marshall survived. 
85Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Providence R. Co., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 282 
(1854). 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 106. 
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Commonwealth v. Hunt. He was a judicial statesman-and to repre- 
sent judicial statesmanship as a thing entirely different and distinct from 
political statesmanship is nonsense. His statesmanship, following his 
conscience, was Tory. The political organization through which in his 
time Toryism, applying that word to Jacksonian democracy, was fight- 
ing for more sun and air, was the amorphous Whig Party. Judicial 
aloofness from political campaigns does not amount to indifference to 
their outcome; and it would be strange if Shaw, always alert to what 
went on in his community, had not at the time anxiously considered the 
danger that the trial of the bootmakers in October, 1840, might divert 
votes from Harrison in November. To his constituency the campaign 
of 1840 seemed the most important since 1800; upon Whig victory de- 
pended'salvation from crazy Jacksonian banking, disorganization and 
insecurity of currency and credit, and above all, perhaps, diminution 
of tariff protection. Seeing their coming triumph in the air, most Boston 
Brahmins might have exulted in the incidental crushing by the law of 
what was left of the trades' union movement which had alarmed them 
in 1835 and 1836. But a Brahmin so level-headed as Shaw might have 
wondered whether Judge Thacher and the district attorney were not 
creating an unnecessary political risk. 
Their game might well have seemed not worth the candle. Rela- 
tions between the organized bootmakers and their employers were har- 
monious. If a few employers did not like the journeymen's society, 
there were more who did. None of them thought that union wages 
were too high or that union workmen were unsatisfactory. There had 
been no strike or threat of strike-no serious labor trouble or indica- 
tion of its likelihood. Of all the cases in the history of labor law in 
which the nominal complainant has been an aggrieved workman, Com- 
monwealth v. Hunt is the only one that occurs to me in which it seems 
probable that no employing interest was actively concerned.87 
In the depression of the early forties, to organize labor in any 
important industry in Massachusetts would have been as impossible 
as for an existing organization to undertake an aggressive policy. Even 
in the middle thirties Massachusetts employers had feared the trades' 
union movement with less reason than employers elsewhere. The 
Middle States had been the main field of that wave. Manured by the 
currency inflation,88 local societies of journeymen in particular skilled 
87 In several of the earlier cases it is certain, and in all the rest it seems likely, 
that prosecution was instigated by employers, often organized for that purpose and 
engaging distinguished counsel. See Appendix. 
8 Superabundant money, even such as it was, meant rising prices, brisk busi- 
ness, and increased demand for labor; therefore opportunity for workmen in the 
skilled trades, if they could get together, to raise their wages (though probably 
not in proportion to the increased cost of living), and incidentally to strike blows 
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trades had sprung up like mushrooms. At New York, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, New Brunswick, Newark, Albany, Troy, Schenectady and 
other centers local societies of many trades had somewhat fused into 
trades' unions-more like modern "city central" labor organizations 
than like modern trade unions. Backed by the newspaper organ, funds 
and boycotting power of a trades' union,89 a local society could usually, 
in the prosperous years before the Panic, weather and win its strikes. 
In several trades, of which the cordwainers' was one, there was also 
loose fusion of neighboring local societies into what aspired to be a 
national society of the trade.90 Such a society, though much less potent 
than a trades' union, could give moral and perhaps a little financial 
backing to local societies of the trade in places too small to have trades' 
unions. The terrifying though not terrible National Trades' Union had 
at least such existence as could be conferred by two annual conventions 
with published proceedings.91 
It is not intended to imply that this movement did not touch Massa- 
chusetts. There was a trades' union at Boston and a good many local 
societies were organized. But the proportion of the laboring class which 
organized was much smaller than in the Middle States. The largest 
manufacture, by long odds, was of textiles. And then, as before and 
since, operatives in the textile mills were for the most part unorganiz- 
able.92 The building trades organized to some extent. But whereas, 
at Philadelphia, not only these trades but even the unskilled coal-heavers 
won after short strikes demands for a working day lasting only from 
six to six, with two hours out for meals,93 the Boston carpenters only 
added a new chapter to their history of failure-and their disastrous 
against practices which it had been futile to fight in the leaner years which pre- 
ceded: hours from dawn to dark, prison labor, dispensing with trained men by 
dividing handiwork (machinery, except in the textile mills, had scarcely com- 
menced its devastations) into separate processes which could easily be taught to 
women or boys. Boys, called apprentices, were counted upon to run away long 
before they had served their time; their use was to dispense with trained men, not 
to multiply them. COMMONS, at 335 ff. 
89 Id., at 360-364. 0 Rantoul's papers include a pamphlet, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF 
CORDWAINERS HOLDEN IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN MARCH, 1836. Delegates 
attended from as far away as Wilmington and New Haven. Those from Albany 
and Washington were unable to attend because of expense. There were none from 
Boston or near it. The convention adopted a standard list of wages, and ap- 
pointed a committee to stimulate organization and strikes, especially in New Eng- 
land, where wages were said to be far below those in the middle states. It en- 
dorsed a few strikes in the neighborhood of New York, but it had no funds with 
which to support them. A proposal to assess members for a strike fund was con- 
sidered. 
91 
COMMONS, at 357-454. 
93 About half were farm girls between eighteen and twenty-five, often in the 
mills for only a year or so; most of the rest were children. C. F. WARE, THE 
EARLY NEW ENGLAND COTTON MANUFACTURE (1931). 
C COMMONS, at 390-2. 
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strike seems to have lasted seven months.94 As against a tendency to- 
ward successful strikes in 1835-36 in the middle states,95 the single 
success in Massachusetts noted in Professor Commons's work was of 
the Salem plasterers.96 Doubtless there were other successful strikes 
there in addition to those of the Boston bootmakers.97 But the painstak- 
ing though inevitably incomplete investigation by Professor Commons's 
associates uncovered only 16 new societies at Boston in 1835-6 as 
against 52 at New York. 
It is to be noted that the Boston organization was of bootmakers- 
not, as in the middle states, of cordwainers more generally.98 Probably 
more people worked at making footwear in eastern Massachusetts than 
in all the middle states put together.99 But most of them were un- 
organizable. For comparative mass production of many sorts of foot- 
wear cheap workmen had been specialized in separate processes.100 And 
the cheaper grades of boots and shoes were made largely by semi- 
professionals in farmhouses in their spare time in winter.10' It is not 
therefore extraordinary to find no mention of any society of cordwain- 
ers anywhere in Massachusetts at this period, except the Boston boot- 
makers. Even in the middle thirties such societies would have been 
few, and very few indeed of them would have lasted into the depres- 
sion following the Panic of 1837. The fully trained workman may have 
retained an importance in bootmaking which he had lost in other 
branches of footwear manufacture. At Boston, in the manufacture of 
superior boots for a superior market, he may have had a special im- 
portance. The survival of the Boston society under conditions in which 
it would have been suicidal to press for higher wages was doubtless 
aided by the generally harmonious relations between its members and 
their employers from its inception. Most of the shops were so small 
that the employers-many of whom as journeymen had belonged to 
the Society in the beginning-would have had somewhat the feelings of 
fellow workmen.102 
In other branches of the footwear industry even the entrepreneurs 
4Id., at 388-9. They had failed also in 1825, 1830, and 1832. Id., at 303, 310. 
"5 Id., at 371, 381 et seq. 
Id., at 387. 
' Supra, text above n. 12. 
8 Note 90, supra. The only division at New York seemed between workers on 
men's and on women's footwear. 
" HAZARD, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOT AND SHOE INDUSTRY IN MASSA- 
CHUSETTS (1921) 113. 
"lId., at 42 ff. At Lynn in 1833 there were about 1600 women shoe-binders 
getting from 12 to 50 cents a day. The Female Society of Lynn succeeded mo- 
mentarily in enrolling nearly 1000 of them. But after losing a strike against a reduction of wages, the Female Society disintegrated. COMMONS, at 355-6. 
10" HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 99, at c. iii, iv. 102 See note 29, supra. 
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of mass production were usually recent graduates from the work- 
bench.103 In the early forties they might well have regarded the Boston 
society with unconcern, if not with friendliness, as a peculiar isolated 
phenomenon which neither touched nor threatened them. The cheap 
labor which they required was superabundant; effective organization 
of it was unthinkable; if trade should improve, fresh labor stpplies 
could be tapped in the farmhouses, and sufficiently trained farmer- 
workmen brought into the shops. Thousands of people in Massachu- 
setts, with no very sharp lines between employers and workmen, made 
footwear; and to consult their interests and prejudices was politically 
important. But feeling that the Boston society was a menace would not 
have been intense or general among them. 
Such feeling would have been more intense among those interested 
in the prosperity of the textile mills. Whigs generally identified that 
prosperity with the welfare of the Commonwealth-rightly, moreover, if 
such an identification was justified by the fact that nearly everyone's 
income was at least indirectly affected by the ups and downs of the 
mills. The incomes of a very large proportion of the "better element" 
were directly affected. Stock in the mills was no longer closely held. 
The founders had ploughed back into the industry the fat dividends of 
the first period of mechanical weaving; their great wealth (liquid in 
the forties and available to capitalize railways) was not immediately 
derived from dividends, but from unloading most of their holdings upon 
others of the well-to-do as over-expansion made it clear that dividends, 
if any, would thenceforth be moderate.104 As early as 1834 it was 
said that seven-eights of the merchants of Boston had direct stakes in 
the mills.105 The numerous stockholders were seldom free from worry 
lest dividends fall below nine per cent on stock for which they had 
probably paid a good deal more than par.106 The better the earnings, 
the safer the salaries of agents and executives. And the interests of 
other numerous groups-mill bankers and distributors of mill products, 
for example-were scarcely less direct. To all such any increase in 
labor costs might spell disaster, and labor organization, even if remote 
from the mills, seemed a menace. There was little over-supply of cheap 
labor that the mills could draw on until the wave of Irish immigration 
in the middle forties. The dismal lives of mill hands were a constant 
theme for reformers; and though the mill hands were unorganizable, 
103 HAZARD, op. cit. supra note 99. 
104 
WARE, op. cit. supra note 92, c. v, vi. 
105 
COMMONS, at 305. 
106As sales of textile stocks were usually private, no market prices are ascer- 
tainable. WARE, op. cit. supra note 92, at 149. 
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attempts to organize them had not infrequently made trouble for mill 
managers.107 
In 1840, when Commonwealth v. Hunt was tried, textile interests, 
enjoying a precarious moment of comparative prosperity,108 would 
have been anxious lest mill hands be stimulated by an acquittal of the 
defendants. In 1841, however, when the appeal was argued,109 Whig 
exultation in victory was already dampened,10 and the textile industry 
was depressed.1l In 1842, when, after about a year's consideration, 
the appeal was finally decided,1"2 the depth of depression made labor 
trouble in the mills unthinkable. And tariff protection, then the absorbing 
concern of textile interests, required workingmen's support. Any ex- 
citement of resentment among even a small group of workingmen might 
jeopardize the prospect of securing the desired legislation. 
The situation of the textile industry was desperate. If the Demo- 
crats should completely abolish the tariffs on their staple products- 
coarse sheetings and shirtings-they would not be hurt. There was no 
longer danger of foreign competition in those products. It was domestic 
over-expansion and over-production which made them sell at a loss in 
glutted markets. The brains of the industry wanted to adapt much of 
its overgrown productive equipment to the manufacture of finer goods. 
But for this to be profitable, a tariff which would prevent the importation 
of such goods was essential.l3 
The death of Harrison had clouded the sunshine which his election 
had shed upon New England investors. Tyler, a disgruntled Democrat, 
had let their Wliig Party use him to elect Harrison; but, obstinately con- 
scientious, he would not let them use him in Harrison's stead. If Con- 
gress voted them a tariff upon finer cotton goods, Tyler might veto it. 
It was essential that Massachusetts should stay Whig. It was Whig 
normally. But it could go Democratic unless the Whigs were careful; 
it had done so in 1839. In spite of the great Whig majority in 1840, the 
balance of parties was nearly even again in 1842; in the fall of that 
year Rantoul was to come within two hundred votes of beating the old 
Whig war-horse, Leverett Saltonstall, for Congress.l14 Great efforts 
107 
Id., at c. ix, x; N. WARE, THE INDUSTRIAL WORKER, 1840-1860 (1924) C. iii, iv. 
108 
WARE, op. cit. supra note 92, at 103. 19 Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 7, 4 Metc. at 115. 110 Harrison must have died within a few days of the unascertainable date when 
the appeal was argued in March Term, 1841. 
111 WARE, op. cit. supra note 92, at 105. 
112 The precise day when the decision was rendered may have been later than 
March, though in March Term, 1842. The Clerk's docket entry "Judgment ar- rested. Defendants to go without day" was on July 18th. 
113 WARE, op. cit. suPra note 92. at 106. 
11Essex Banner (Haverhill), Nov. 5, 1842. 
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were being made to win everyone possible, especially workingmen, to 
the "American System" of protection; in the first half of 1842 there 
was scarcely an issue of a Whig newspaper that did not contain tariff 
propaganda, or reports of propagandist meetings. The campaign was 
going well. Under the Compromise Act of 1832 all tariffs were near 
the vanishing point. The Whig papers were loudly announcing the 
danger, which not all Democratic papers quite dared to deny, of vast im- 
portations of shoes from France. On March 2, 1842, there was a con- 
vention at Boston of the Shoe and Leather trade to "consider the effects 
of anticipated changes in duties on American Labor." Amasa Walker, 
a Democrat, presided. The meeting was addressed by Abbott Lawrence, 
one of the great men of textiles, and by Rantoul.1l4a The resolutions 
adopted, after bowing (perhaps in deference to Rantoul) to free trade as 
an ideal, declared its impracticality while Britain sought commercial 
monopoly. "The products of American labor (unless guarded by whole- 
some legislation) must fall beneath the shock of European competition." 
"As the manufacture of Boots, Shoes and Leather is almost exclusively 
labor, the manufacturers of these articles have a right to claim (if not 
demand) of Congress the protection which shall enable them to perform 
their relations with comfort to themselves and honor to their country." 
"The 40,000 shoemakers of the Old Bay State are ready to raise their 
voices to the last, and cast their all against any measure that shall have a 
tendency to give to the monopolists of Europe the profits of our indus- 
try."115 While such appeals were ringing in their ears, it would be 
dangerous to throw out among workingmen any fresh bone of conten- 
tion; demagogues and reformers might win enough votes to sway the 
balance of power. 
I am convinced that Shaw was subconsciously if not consciously in- 
fluenced by such a thought when he decided Commonwealth v. Hunt. 
Much evidence to support it was within his knowledge. He doubtless 
knew a better reason for not following the New York case, People v. 
Fisher, than he gave in his opinion.16 A trial judge in that jurisdic- 
tion relied upon its authority in the prosecution of some journeymen 
tailors in 1836.17 The tailors were convicted and sentenced. Their fines 
were paid by subscription. At a public meeting attended, it was said, 
by 27,000 persons, "chiefly radicals," both the trial judge and Chief 
Justice Savage, who had written in People v. Fisher, were burned in 
11a Record of these speeches was found while this article was in press. See 
Added Note following Appendix. 
l5 Massachusetts Ploughman and Yankee Patriot, March 5 and 19, 1842. 
116 See supra, text above n. 66. 
17 Appendix, Case 17. 
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effigy, and resolutions adopted for the formation of a workingmen's 
party.s18 The resulting organization, fusing with the Loco Foco Party 
and endorsing Whig against Tammany candidates, defeated two out of 
four Tammany candidates for Congress; one of the successful Tammany 
candidates, Ely Moore, who was president of the National Trades' 
Union, had the workingmen's support.119 Tammany continued simi- 
larly to be beaten until it bought the schismatic leaders into its fold. 
This much Shaw would have known from newspapers and conversation. 
The presence in Rantoul's file of papers used in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 
of a pamphlet report of the proceedings of a convention of the National 
Society of Cordwainers in 1836 suggests the possibility, of course doubt- 
ful, that Shaw may have become acquainted with some of the rhetoric 
which agitators applied to Chief Justice Savage and his opinion.120 He 
may have heard also of the unfavorable reactions of juries at Philadel- 
phia and in New York state to Judge Savage's view of the law.121 
The soil of New England, though uncongenial to effective labor 
unions, was congenial to movements, three quarters ethical, one quarter 
political, which somewhat obstructed the march of Tory industrialism. 
The traditional social faith of farmers of the rocky hillsides such as had 
joined Shay's Rebellion or opposed ratification of the Constitution was 
an emotional Jeffersonianism. This faith spread from the farms into 
towns where other than textile manufacturers were developing. When 
labor movements turned, as they always did, from unsuccessful strikes 
to less unsuccessful agitation for reforms, they found allies in the farm- 
ers. In 1830 "farmers, mechanics, and workingmen," protesting that 
while the producers of wealth were becoming poorer, the consumers of 
wealth were becoming richer, had elected candidates to legislatures.122 
A few years later the New England Association of Farmers, Mechanics 
and other Workingmen had cut a swath-though not a very wide one, 
since the Association found that "the more industrious and useful part 
118 COMMONS, at 408-410. 
119 Id., at 461-465. 
120A large part of the pamphlet, supra note 90, is a report of a committee to 
investigate People v. Fisher. A brief sample of the committee's rhetoric must 
suffice: "The gist of all this is, that the journeyman mechanic shall not have the 
privileges enjoyed by others. . . . The judge has forgot . . . the conspiracies and 
the combinations of the rich against the poor. . . . The only difference is that the 
poor have not the means nor the power to prosecute successfully those pirates upon 
the products of labor. . . . The mechanics have been obliged to resort to combina- 
tions among themselves, to obtain that which the God of Nature intended as their 
right, but which avarice denies them-a comfortable subsistence. And after having 
been compelled to resort to such a measure, they are to be . . . incarcerated in a 
loathesome prison." 
This rhetoric was restrained in comparison with that of other labor spokesmen 
upon the same subject. COMMONS, at 408-410. 
12 Appendix, Cases 18 and 19. 
122 COMMONS, at 290-296. 
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of the population" were "too intent upon their daily occupation to form 
combinations for mutual advantage, or to guard against the devices of 
their better informed or more enterprising neighbors."123 Politicians 
turned the propaganda of such movements to their own uses. Where, 
as in New York, New Hampshire and Maine, the Democratic Party was 
strong, "Fed-ism" and "Workey-ism" were natural allies; but where, 
as in Massachusetts, Federalist-Whigs were normally in power, alliances 
between Workey-ism and Jackson-ism were equally natural. 
In 1842 the air of depression was charged with intimations of what 
might become formidable radical movements. Orestes Brownson was 
citing the wretched lives of mill hands as evidence of the need of de- 
throning special privilege.l24 More respected exponents of equally 
radical philosophies were troubling and perhaps half-convincing large 
audiences of the respectable classes: Emerson, Thoreau, Theodore Par- 
ker, the Channings, Whittier, Lowell in his early phase, and many 
others then as well known.125 Though the experiments of which Brook 
Farm is the least forgotten came a little later, there was already propa- 
ganda for Fourrierism-communistic association which would assure 
to everyone "the full product of his toil" and the expansion of his 
personality; on March 1, 1842, Horace Greeley gave the Fourrierist 
Albert Brisbane a column in the first issue of the New York Tribune.l26 
If such a man as Rantoul, whose basic tenet was the class struggle,127 
but who could talk to Gloucester fishermen in language which drew an 
approving letter from John Marshall,128 and who, as Democratic leader 
in the Massachusetts legislature in the later thirties, had, with Whittier's 
help, blocked many cherished schemes of the Whig majority29--if such 
a man were given the bootmakers' case to take into politics, the repercus- 
sions upon the campaign for tariff protection might be disastrous. The 
result expected from protection, prosperity, could be trusted to dis- 
solve radicalism.130 During depression it would not have been sensible 
to risk further excitement of uneasy minds and consciences by declaring 
the criminality of an actually inoffensive labor union in a case with which 
no important interest was in fact deeply concerned. 
Enough conscience had already been troubled by labor conditions 
123 Id., at 302-318. 
124 Id., at 495. 
25 2 PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927) 315-351, 
379-425. 
16 
COMMONS, at 501; N. WARE, op. cit. supra note 107, c. iii, xi. 
127 
HAMILTON, op. cit. supra note 46, at 300 et seq., and passim. 
'28 Id., at 155. 
129 Id., at 308-424. 
30 Prosperity until 1846 in fact ensued, though not for the mill hands or 
cordwainers. WARE, op. cit. supra note 92, at 107; N. WARE, op. cit. supra note 
107, c. iv. 
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to demand and obtain some measures in alleviation. Van Buren, by 
executive order, had established the ten hour day for federal employees 
in 1840.131 On March 3, 1842, the legislature of Massachusetts made 
it unlawful to employ children under the age of twelve in the mills for 
more than ten hours a day.132 Since experience had shown that small 
children were not usually worth their sixty-seven cents a week, this 
legislation was objectionable to textile interests only upon principle. 
There can be no question but that Shaw's holding that a labor 
organization could lawfully compel employers and independent working- 
men to comply with its regulations was similarly objectionable. But 
Shaw, sure that he knew better the best interests of the textile industry 
than mill stockholders themselves, was not the man to invite trouble 
for the sake of a sterile rag of principle. Unradical though he was, he 
was not the sort of unradical, latterly common in Massachusetts, whom 
Anatole France might have called, as he did Cicero, "a Moderate of the 
most violent description." Shaw was level-headed. 
He was at pains therefore to convey to textile interests that they 
need not fear increased danger of labor organization in the mills as a 
result of his decision. Several times in his opinion he went out of his 
way to iterate that a combination to break contracts of employment, or 
to induce their breach, would be criminal.133 Mill labor, though sub- 
ject to lay-off if business became slack and to discharge virtually at 
will, was customarily employed by contract, often in writing, for a 
year's work. In the girl-power mills, the operators agreed to remain 
with the company for twelve months at fixed rates of wage, to live in 
the company boarding houses, to observe whatever might be the com- 
pany's regulations, to attend public worship, not to drink or smoke, and 
not to organize or strike on pain of forfeiture of wages (which were 
payable not oftener than monthly).134 
IV 
What has preceded suggests that the campaign for tariff protection 
may have had a larger share of responsibility for the decision of Com- 
monwealth v. Hunt than the reasons stated in the opinion. But whatever 
31 COMMONS, at 395. 
133 WARE, op. cit. supra note 92, at 289. 
133 Supra note 72. It will be observed that Shaw treated as obvious the doctrine 
whose public career was not to commence until Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216 
(Q. B. 1853). 
134 WARE, op. cit. supra note 92, at 263-8. The following is an example of a 
contract used in a child-power mill: "Agreed with Abel Dudley for himself and 
family to work one year from the last day of March past at the following rates, 
viz.: self, four shillings threepence (71 cents) per day to tend picker, Mary eight 
shillings ($1.33) per week, Caroline four shillings (67 cents) per week. Mary and 
Caroline have the privilege of going to school two months each, one at a time, 
and Amos is to work at four shillings per week when they are out." Id., at 260. 
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may have been the "real question" in that case and the "true grounds" 
of the decision, the case was taken at face value as meaning that work- 
men could lawfully do in combination any act that they could lawfully 
do individually, and there were but few resorts to law to restrain effec- 
tive trade unionism in the ensuing twenty years. It does not appear 
that any labor case in that period was fought through to a finish.135 In 
spite of this wide gap in the long line of labor cases, Dr. E. E. Witte, 
whose opinions are always entitled to respect, says that Commonwealth 
v. Hunt "seems to have had comparatively little effect upon the develop- 
ment of the law of labor combinations; . . . that there were not more 
such cases [in the next twenty years] is readily explained by the almost 
complete absence of strikes."'36 But that there were not more strikes 
(Commons estimates that there were four hundred in 1853-1854)137 
may be as readily explained by the probability that a good many em- 
ployers, on the advice of counsel to whom few names were as great as 
Chief Justice Shaw's, put up with labor unions which, had Common- 
wealth v. Hunt gone the other way, the law would have been invited to 
crush. After prosperity arrived in the fifties, trade unions became 
stranger and more numerous than at any earlier time,'38 and no com- 
parable period has such a record of non-resort to the courts against 
their activities. 
With another opinion of Dr. Witte's I agree entirely: that the law 
and labor situation prior to Commonwealth v. Hunt has been misrepre- 
sented by most of the few writers who have given attention to it. The 
impression is abroad that medieval legal doctrines had been enforced 
against labor unions with medieval ferocity. The facts are that the 
basic doctrine19 was one which has sharpened its teeth in the modern 
injunction era; that, though nearly all the cases were criminal prosecu- 
tions, in none "was a single workman sentenced to jail, and only in the 
New York tailors' case were heavy fines imposed"; and that we have 
record of only nine convictions as against four acquittals.140 Through- 
out the period before the Civil War the power of Jeffersonianism was 
"13Dr. Witte's patient and careful research has found newspaper mention of 
the beginning of only three cases in this period, and no mention of further proceed- 
ings in any. Early American Labor Cases (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 825, 829, n. 18. 
In 1853 some Baltimore employers of machinists circulated among their employees 
the written opinion of some lawyers that a combination to raise wages is criminal. 
COMMONS, at 611-12. The statement in COMMONS, loc. cit., that in 1853-1854 
"employers quite often invoked the aid of the law" is not supported and seems 
misleading. 
136 Witte, supra note 135, at 828-9. 7 
COMMONS, at 607; N. WARE, op. cit. supra note 107, c. xv. 
138 Id., at 575-623. 
139 See supra, text above n. 4. 
140 See Appendix. The nine convictions were in Cases 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13 
and 17; the four acquittals (including verdict for the defendant in the one civil 
action) in Cases 12, 14, 18 and 19. 
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tremendous. There would have been more cases otherwise. And when 
Toryism pressed and won an occasional case, its moderation in victory 
was well advised. 
Though the long run tendency of cyclical depressions and prosperi- 
ties in the forties and fifties was to nourish Toryism, Americans re- 
mained for the time being preponderantly Jeffersonian.l41 It was to 
what came as near to a Golden Age as our democracy has enjoyed, that 
Shaw's decision contributed. 
In many of its aspects this not-very-near Golden Age was unlovely. 
The common man held the center of the stage, bowing his head to none. 
If he did not see himself beautiful as Narcissus, he wore his ugliness 
with complacency. The cult of the Hamiltonian bitch-goddess, Success, 
was embraced by Jacksonians foul with tobacco juice, who stripped it 
of decencies that had been dear to the old Federalist aristocracy. Fine- 
ness of living had often either to hide in corners or be ostracized for 
its idiosyncrasy. "The society around Poe had no more use for an 
architectural imagination than the Puritan had for decorative images; 
the smoke of the factory chimney was incense, the scars on the landscape 
were as the lacerations of a saint, and the mere multiplication of gaunt 
sheds and barracks was a sign of progress and therefore an earnest of 
perfection."'42 The Jefferson who solaced himself with a violin and 
built the University of Virginia would surely not have found this society 
excellent. 
Yet he might have found it on the whole better than most others- 
better, for instance, than a society in which Tory interests would not 
have needed public relations counsel of the calibre of Webster and Clay. 
For there was another side to the picture. If even in the best of times 
the life of the common man was arduous, nevertheless at all times he 
could live relatively well. In depressions the poorest and worst hit were 
safe from starvation. The Lynn shoemakers "were able to weather 
repeated depressions in their trade because they were more than shoe- 
makers. They were citizens of a semi-rural community. Each had his 
own garden, a pig and a cow. They were fishermen, more or less, and 
during a spell of depression in the shoe trade they could keep alive, at 
1 The short-hand description of social conflict as between Toryism and Jeffer- 
sonianism may both invite and deserve adverse criticism. The conflict might more 
accurately be described as many-sided. But the simple antithesis seems useful, and 
more complex analysis superfluous. 
The conflict should not be represented as between altruistic principles to the 
exclusion of dumb animal appetites. Principles are often enough mere window 
dressing. It is intended, perhaps unsuccessfully, that the words Tory and Jeffer- sonian shall convey the whole body of opposing wants, wants for more money and more food as well as wants to live in a good or best possible society. 
1" MUMFORD, STICKS AND STONES (1924) 81-2. 
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least, on sea-food, pork, and garden truck."143 Though in the forties 
and fifties these conditions were changing, so long as land in the indus- 
trial regions was generally under cultivation, for food rather than for 
money crops, the unemployed artisan or day laborer could earn his liv- 
ing, even without going West. He was not helplessly dependent upon a 
machine which at any moment might cease to need him. Between laborers, 
mechanics, small merchants and professional men the gaps were narrow. 
All were rather generally persons of some consequence. They counted. 
Work was more often congenial than under later conditions; in spite of 
increasing production of shoddy wares, there was more chance for satis- 
faction in workmanship and in the social intercourse of the job. Family 
life was more often affectionate, and social relations more genuinely 
cordial. Diversions, lean as they may seem-lectures, sermons, barbe- 
cues, church socials, parlor music-were more diverting. Countless 
families of no very exalted social position have left evidence that im- 
agination and taste, whatever their level, were active: libraries of roman- 
tic poetry and fiction, "original" sentiments and verses inscribed in neat 
Spencerian hands on the flower-bordered pages of red leather blank 
books, diaries and letters painfully concerned for literary elegance. If 
intellectual excellence was rare, so was intellectual emptiness. The 
fishermen and farmers of Scituate listened for hours on the Fourth of 
July to Rantoul's profundity. As to the intelligence of their reactions 
nothing need be hazarded. At least the effect was not that of the same 
number of hours at the movies or within sound of a radio. Mediocre 
faculties were in general exercised with variety and zest. Life was lived 
with an approach to fullness by vast numbers of commonplace people. 
It may be questioned whether in any other time or country so large a 
proportion of the population have enjoyed such substantiality of satis- 
factions. 
Commonwealth v. Hunt was not, I think, trivial among the factors 
that helped maintain for a while the upstandingness of the common man 
and the considerableness of his living. And the breakdown of its 
authority may be seen as one of the factors that have made the con- 
temporary social landscape. 
In New Jersey in 1867, in a case whose facts were virtually identi- 
cal, Commonwealth v. Hunt was "distinguished."144 In the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the same year it was held controlling 
against a sailor's boarding housekeeper who sued civilly a combination 
of other crimps who had destroyed his business by boycott.145 But never 
afterwards in a labor case. When it was said in Massachusetts in 1896 
143 N. WARE, op. cit. supra note 107, at xiii. 
144 State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151 (1867). 
5 Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen 499 (Mass. 1867). 
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that the lawfulness of various sorts of trade union activities seemed "to 
have been decided as long ago as 1842 by the good sense of Chief Jus- 
tice Shaw," the opinion was by Holmes, J., dissenting.146 
WALTER NELLES 
YALE SCHOOL OF LAW 
1 In Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 109, 44 N. E. 1077, 1082 (1896). 
I shall deal in other articles with the labor law of the period between the Civil 
War and 1900. One article upon the events of 1877 which mark the commence- 
ment of resort to equity in labor cases has been published: Nelles, A Strike and 
Its Legal Consequences (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 507. 
APPENDIX 
AMERICAN LABOR CASES BEFORE COMMONWEALTH V. HUNT 
This Appendix notes at least the facts deemed crucial and the result (when ascertainable) 
of every one of the known cases. I have not attempted the probably useless task of finding cases 
other than those discovered by Professor Commons' associates, Professor Eugene A. Gilmore and 
Dr. E. E. Witte, whose results are published in the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUS- 
TRIAL SOCIETY (1910), here cited as Doc. HIST., and in COMMONS AND ASSOCIATES, HISTORY OF 
LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES (1918), here cited as COMMONS. 
Counsel and judges in Commonwealth v. Hunt mentioned specifically only Case 3 (Sampson's 
pamphlet report of which served both sides as a text-book), Case 7, Case 9 (cited by Shaw in 
connection with his contract dicta), and Case 16 (which had been the only case against a labor 
union to go further than a trial court). These cases are here summarized fully. Probably no 
reports of any others were accessible at Boston. But the notoriety, still recent in 1840-1842, 
of Cases 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20 has seemed to justify inclusion of more details about them 
than were likely to be clearly known at Boston. Though it was doubtless known that there 
had been earlier cases, impressions were probably very vague. The notes of the other cases 
have therefore been cut down to little more than bare mention. 
Citations, except of the five cases reported in volumes accessible in well-equipped law 
libraries, are to the reprints of pamphlet and newspaper reports in Doc. HIST. Unless other- 
wise noted, the cases are criminal prosecutions for conspiracy. 
A. Cases in the period of manufacturing expansion stimulated by the Napoleonic Wars, 1805- 
1815. 
1. Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case, 1805-6, 3 Doc. HIST. 59.a The charge of the court 
was doctrinally very broad and loose. In Case 6 Chief Justice Gibson explained this case, 
consistently with its facts, as holding that the coercion of unwilling journeymen was an unlaw- 
ful object or means. Defendants fined $8.00 and costs. 
2. Baltimore Cordwainers' Case, 1809, 3 Doc. HIST. 249. It was charged that the 39 
defendants had compelled a master to discharge certain journeymen and prevented them from 
obtaining employment. After two weeks' trial, one defendant was found guilty. There is no 
record that he was ever sentenced. 
3. New York Cordwainers' Case, 1809-1810, reported sub nom. People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler's 
Crim. Cas. 262-282; fuller pamphlet report by Sampson, reprinted in 3 Doc. HIsT. 251. In 1809 
a union comprising about half of the journeymen in the city called a strike against a master 
who gave work to a non-member's apprentice; and when the master (probably backed by an 
employers' association formed to combat the union, though evidence to that effect was ex- 
cluded as irrelevant) got his work done in other masters' shops, the union called a "general" 
strike. Twenty-four members were then indicted, the celebrated Thomas Addis Emmet being 
retained as special prosecutor. The prosecution focussed upon the union by-laws forbidding 
members to work with non-members or for employers' hiring non-members. In 1809 Sampsonb 
a This case is the subject of my article cited supra note 1. b William Sampson, 1764-1836, formerly, like Emmet, a Dublin barrister, had been deported 
like Emmet for participation in the activities of the United Irishmen. In this case he spent 
himself upon the motion to quash before Mayor Clinton, thereafter revising and publishing his 
argument which was penetrating as well as monumental. His research has been serviceable not 
only to Rantoul, but also to Sir R. S. Wright [LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES, (1873)] and 
Professor Sayre [Criminal Conspiracy (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV. 393]. At the trial of the Cord- 
wainers' Case he was compelled, himself exhausted, to address a tired jury after eight o'clock at 
night; and seems to have been driven to reading from his former argument. 3 Doc. HIST. 372-374. 
That he was ineffective is evidenced by the fact that Emmet, the next day, ventured adroitly to say 
so, opening his argument with the statement that he did not intend to advert to a single law 
case "because he had observed with what pain the jury had endeavoured to listen to the 
elaborate arguments of his learned adversaries." The most intelligent jurors that ever were 
empanelled could not, said Emmet, "be expected to follow the clearest logician through a range 
of arguments which it must have cost a practised and educated lawyer so much time and trouble 
to compose"-a fact which makes it wise that they take the law from the court, and not use 
their right or power to decide law as well as fact. Id., at 380. The district attorney read this 
to the jury in Commonwealth v. Hunt. 
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and Golden, for the defendants, argued a motion to quash upon the same grounds later urged 
successfully by Rantoul in Commonwealth v. Hunt. Mayor De Witt Clinton, presiding at Gen- 
eral Sessions, doubtless recognized the case as political dynamite. For he was still holding the 
motion undecided when he went out of office some months later. His successor, Jacob Ratcliff, 
declined to decide the motion without hearing it re-argued; and counsel, for reasons which the 
report leaves obscure, finally abandoned their motion and went to trial. Mayor Ratcliff's charge 
is the first succinct assertion of what became the mainstay of labor prosecutions-the doctrine that 
the defendants' refusal to work with non-members is coercive, and therefore unlawful, because 
it is concerted action by a number of persons. Defendants fined $1.00 and costs. 
4. Pittsburgh Cordwainers' Case, 1814, unreported. Stated, 4 Doc. HIST. 27-8, to have 
been compromised by the journeymen paying the costs and abandoning a strike for higher wages. 
5. Pittsburgh Cordwainers' Case, 1815, 4 Doc. HIST. 15. The court, on facts like those 
of the preceding cases, treated the Philadelphia case, supra Case 1, as a controlling precedent. 
The special prosecutor was Henry Baldwin, the leading lawyer of the "Western Country," later 
appointed by President Jackson to the Supreme Court. Baldwin's efforts were directed mainly to 
convincing the jury that the prosecution was consistent with "sound Republicanism." Recorder 
Levy, who had presided at the Philadelphia trial, was a "sound Republican"; defendants' inva- 
sions (non-violent) of the freedom of other workmen to obtain employment, were inconsistent 
with "the words penned by Mr. Jefferson in the declaration of our independence." Protesting 
that he invoked common sense rather than common law, he expatiated upon the dangers of 
labor organizations to the morals and prosperity of an outfitting station for westward-moving 
pioneers. Defendants fined $1.00 and costs. 
B. Cases in the period of manufacturing prosperity which commenced with the second ad- 
ministration of Monroe, 1821-1829. 
6. Commonwealth v. Carlisle, 1821, Brightly's Nisi Prius (Pa.) 36. Gibson, J., declined to 
quash a prosecution of master cordwainers, instigated by journeymen seeking to turn the tables, 
for conspiracy to depress wages. The question was, did the defendants want to re-establish or 
to disturb a wage-scale prescribed by Nature (= supply and demand). Only a jury could 
answer it.e The prosecution was probably dropped. 
7. People v. Trequier (New York Hatters' Case), 1823, 1 Wheeler's C. C. 142. On internal 
facts almost identical with those of Commonwealth v. Hunt except that the nominal complaining 
witness was probably a cat's-paw of an employers' association fighting an aggressive union, the 
court charged that the defendants' combination to exclude the complaining witness from em- 
ployment by refusing to work with him was unlawful. Defendants found guilty. Sentences not 
reported. 
8. Buffalo Tailors' Case, 1824, 4 Doc. HIST. 93. The meagre newspaper report mentions 
that "a singular custom among the Jours. to coerce the refractory was proved to exist throughout 
the United States, by which the person who should refuse to come into the measures of the 
majority, or who . . . should . . . [during a strike] labor . . . for less than the wages de- 
manded, was stigmatized by an appropriate name, and rendered too infamous to be allowed to 
labor in any shop where his conduct should be known." One jury disagreed. A new jury "under 
direction of the court, found the defendants guilty, and they were fined $2.00 each." 
9. Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 1827, 4 Pick. 425. In a civil action between 
rival manufacturers for enticing away plaintiffs workmen, the court (reversing Chief Justice 
Parker's holding at the trial) held that "the defendants had a legal right to make a contract 
with the plaintiff's laborers to take effect after the expiration of their term of service with the 
plaintiff." Lemuel Shaw was of counsel. 
10. Twenty-Four Journeymen Tailors, Philadelphia, 1827, 4 Doc. HIST. 99. Following a 
difference in the interpretation of an agreed wage-scale, an employer discharged six workmen; 
fourteen others struck, backed by their union. The shop was picketed, and there was violence, 
clearly unpremeditated, on both sides. Following the court's charge, the jury acquitted the 
defendants on counts charging overt acts of violence, and found them guilty on a count charging 
conspiracy to induce the re-employment of the six discharged workmen by the unlawful means of 
endeavoring "by promises, offers of money, threats and otherwise" to induce other workmen not 
to work in the struck shop and other shops to refuse to execute its commissions. Sentences not 
reported. 
11. Philadelphia Spinners, 1829, 4 Doc. HIST. 265. Three striking textile operatives who 
had threatened strike-breakers were bound over to keep the peace. The court enlarged upon the 
will and power of the law to protect workmen as well as employers if they will but resort to it. 
No record of any further proceedings. 
12. Baltimore Weavers, 1829, 4 Doc. HIST. 269. Journeymen and other masters alike had 
joined in condemnation of a master weaver who tried to cut his men to a cash wage lower than 
the wages paid, largely in truck, by his competitors. Most of the journeymen of the city took 
and kept an oath not to work for him. He had thirteen indicted for conspiracy to impoverish him. 
The court directed an acquittal. 
13. Chambersburg Shoemakers, Pennsylvania, 1829, 4 Doc. HIST. 273. The defendants were 
convicted on an indictment charging conspiracy "to prejudice such as were not members" as well 
as to raise wages. Ringleader fined $10.00 and costs, and three others $5.00 each. 
C. Cases during the boom of the middle 1830s. 
14. Thompsonville Carpet Manufacturing Co. v. Taylor, Connecticut, 1834-1836, Supplement 
(a separate volume) to 4 Doc. HIST. 15. Civil action for damages due to interruption of manu- 
facturing by a strike or lock-out. The company had refused to increase wages on the ground that 
diminishing tariff protection made it impossible, and locked out its men, offering to take them 
back upon their acceptance of new and exasperating regulations. The primary object of the 
action seems to have been to intimidate the men by arrests of leaders under civil process. But 
it was carried through against one obdurate leader after the strike had been broken by importa- 
c As a precursor of the not yet entirely discredited modern doctrine of motive as the test of 
the unlawfulness of combinations, Chief Justice Gibson's opinion is the most interesting of the 
whole series. But since its doctrine was of little practical importance until near the end of the 
century, analysis of it is postponed to a later article. 
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tion of eleven weavers to instruct unskilled hands. At the first trial, August, 1834, the verdict 
was for the defendant. On re-trial in the Superior Court a month later the jury disagreed. At 
the third trial, January, 1836, there was evidence that pickets had met all arriving boats during 
the strike, and a few arriving weavers had left without applying for jobs, in some instances after 
receiving a dollar or so from the strikers to pay their fares. The strikers had hissed and spit at 
a weaver who, after his arrest in the action, had gone back to work on the company's terms. 
The court charged that the combination of the men was lawful if their intention was merely to 
withhold their own labor until their conditions were met, unlawful if the intent was to coerce 
the company by interruption of its business. Verdict was for the defendant. 
15. Taylor v. Thompsonville Carpet Manufacturing Co., Connecticut, 1834-1837, Supplement 
to 4 Doc. HIST. 15. In 1834, after the second trial of the preceding case, Taylor, a defendant 
therein, sued the company for malicious institution of the action and malicious arrest in it. The 
County Court overruled a demurrer to his declaration. The company removed the case to the 
Superior Court, where it lay inactive until February, 1837, when, with other similar actions, it 
was discontinued. 
16. People v. Fisher, New York, 1835, 14 Wend. 2. The indictment charged that the 
defendants, journeymen shoemakers employed by one Lum at Geneva, N. Y., agreed that coarse 
boots should not be made for less than $1.00 a pair; that any journeyman making such boots 
for less should be fined $10.00, and that until his fine was paid no journeyman should work for 
any master who gave him work; that in August, 1833,. one Pennock made a pair of coarse boots 
for Lum for seventy-five cents and refused to pay the fine, and the defendants compelled Lum to 
dismiss Pennock by refusing to work until he did so. 
A decision below sustaining a demurrer was reversed by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice 
Savage reasoned as follows: "Without any officious or improper interference on the subject, the 
price . . . will be regulated by the demand for the manufactured article and the value of that 
which is paid for it; but the right does not exist to enhance the price of the article, or the 
wages of the mechanic, by any forced or artificial means." The mechanic "may say that he will not make coarse boots for less than one dollar per pair, but he has no right to say that no other mechanic shall make them for less. ... If one individual does not possess such a right over the conduct of another, no number of individuals can possess such a right. All combinations therefore to effect such an object are injurious, not only to the individual particularly oppressed, but to the public at large. In the present case, an industrious man was driven out of employ- ment by the unlawful measures pursued by the defendants, and an injury done to the community, 
by diminishing the quantity of productive labor, and of internal trade." 
The indictment was under a provision of the N. Y. Revised Statutes of 1829 including among criminal conspiracies "conspiracy to injure trade or commerce," without definition. The court 
considered the statute as continuing a common law crime, not as creating a new one. 
Whether, after the Supreme Court's decision, the case was tried below is unknown. The 
staleness of the controversy-the first indictment had been found in November, 1833-makes it 
likely that it was not. But the decision was given wide publicity, and had its bite in the next case. 17. Twenty Journeymen Tailors, New York City, 1836, 4 Doc. HIST. 315. Three months after a successful strike for higher wages, the tailors struck again, in January, 1836, to enforce com- 
pliance with a demand that the masters post on slates "the names of their journeymen as they 
successively took out their jobs; no one was to take a job out of his turn, and no one to have a second job until all had been supplied." Squads of 8 to 15 pickets paraded all day before the struck shops, "often spreading their cloaks and coats before the windows to darken them, insult- 
ing, vilifying, and applying the most opprobrious epithets to the journeymen who continued in 
employ; dignifying them with the name of 'dungs'; following and intercepting their movements when they went away with jobs, and threatening them with violence unless they struck, quit work and joined them. These acts of outrage and insult continued for nearly or quite three 
months, . . . to the great loss and detriment of employers, the frequent disturbance of the 
peace, the collection 'of tumultuous assemblages, the alarm of many who were timid." The 
Journeymen Tailors Society was backed in the strike by the Trades' Union. 
Twenty journeymen were tried for conspiracy to injure trade and commerce. They were also indicted "for riot, and assault and battery, etc."; but it does not appear that these indict- ments were ever tried. The charge of Judge Edwards, following People v. Fisher, supra Case 16, treated the Society as criminal irrespective of the alleged violence and disorder; the defendants' offence was complete when they acted, however moderately, pursuant to agreement not to work for any master who employed men below their rates or otherwise violated their requirements. "It would be for the jury to say whether any body of men could raise their crests in this land of 
law, and control others by self-organized combination." 
The jury found the defefdants guilty, recommending clemency. The court fined one $150, another $100, and the rest $50 each, in all $1,150 which was paid at once by subscription. A court officer contributed three weeks' pay to the fund. 
Judge Edward said in passing sentence: "In this favoured land of law and liberty, the road to advancement is open to all, and the journeymen may by their skill and industry, and moral worth, soon become master mechanics .... Every American knows . . . that he has no better friend than the laws, and that he needs no artificial combination for his protection." Such com- binations "are of foreign origin, and I am led to believe are upheld mainly by foreigners." De- fendants' counsel stated that eleven of the twenty defendants were native born, two Irish, three Scottish and four English; and that five of these alien born were naturalized. 
18. Hudson Shoemakers, New York, 1836, 4 Doc. HIST. 277, reprinting a pamphlet cir- culated as propaganda against People v. Fisher, supra Case 16. The principal evidence for the prosecution concerned the situation as between the complaining witness, a "boss" named Mosier, and the local Journeymen's Society. Mosier undertook to reduce wages below the Society's scale. His men struck. Mosier offered to pay sixpence more than the Society's prescribed minimum; but he could get no men because he would not pay a fine of $25.00 imposed by the Society for reducing wages. A travelling job-hunting journeyman left town without taking work from him because he "was told he was s scabbed boss" and "did not want to disturb the Society." The prosecution relied upon People v. Fisher. The defendants offered no evidence. Their counsel, John W. Edmonds, after attacking the English cases and People v. Fisher, anticipated the economics of the next century in his argument: "To justify a conviction the injury must be to the trade of the whole community. Although Mosier and Shattuck may have sold less, yet other masters sold more. The same number were made and consumed . ... I cannot comprehend 
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hoy an injury to the trade of one part and a corresponding benefit to another part, can operate to 
the injury of the whole. . . . Nor can I see the great danger which some anticipate from these 
combinations. If the mechanic gets more pay, I can see how we, who are not mechanics, have 
more to pay. We may become poorer, but he will be just so much the richer-yet I can see no 
diminution from the aggregate wealth of the community. It appears to me that the thing, if let 
alone, will regulate itself. If the journeymen tailors, by means of their combinations, get the 
prices of their work so high that we cannot afford to pay them, we shall not go without clothes, 
we shall make them ourselves as you do now and for the same reason, because it is our interest 
to do so. Nor will our whole city be without bread, because the journeymen bakers are extrava- 
gant in their demands. We will make it ourselves, as many of us do now. If they persist in their 
extravagance, they must either starve from their obstinacy, adopt some other calling, or retrace 
their steps until they find the proper level with other things in the community. If the farmer 
raises the price of provisions, the mechanic will raise the price of his fabrics, and thus the 
whole matter will regulate itself. The mischief is, when everything else is enhanced in value, 
that you will attempt to keep any one class down to old values, and thus exclude them from a 
just participation in the general prosperity." 
The charge of the court was seemingly for conviction: "Heretofore all combinations of this 
nature have been deemed unlawful"; such proceedings as the defendants' strike home to the feel- 
ings; in a case parallel with this [People v. Fisher] the Supreme Court decided the statute was 
violated. But it was left to the jury to say whether the controlling of labor "in this manner" had 
a tendency to injure trade. And they were told that it was their duty to judge of the law, and 
if they "were willing to assume the responsibility and say that the Supreme Court was wrong, they 
had a right to do so." 
They did so, finding the defendants not guilty. And on the title page of the pamphlet publica- 
tion of the record, the case is described as one "where Twelve Patriotic Jurymen set aside by their verdict the decision of Chief Justice Savage, thus rescuing the rights of the Mechanics from 
the grasp of Tyranny and Oppression." 
19. Philadelphia Plasterers, 1836, 4 Doc. HIST. 335. It seems that two plasterers refused 
to work for their employer while he employed the complaining witness. Recorder Bouvier 
charged the grand jury which found the indictment that though "the law permits individuals to 
value their own services at their arbitrary will, . . . the moment the combination is formed for 
the purpose of controlling others, . . . it becomes illegal." A report in a labor paper says that the 
complaining witness, "having been convinced of his folly," abandoned the prosecution; "in this 
dilemma, Mr. Todd, the Attorney General of the State . . . seeing, as he said, an 'immense 
principle' involved . . . became the responsible prosecutor." It quotes the Public Ledger as 
saying that at the trial Mr. Todd displayed "one talent, in which he was certainly preeminent; we 
mean the talent of vituperation." For the defendants' David Paul Brown "exhibited the in- 
significance of the charge, and the want of sense and judgment manifested in the language of the 
indictment, which charged the defendants with having driven away (by doing nothing) Mr. 
Cowperthwaite's 'hands.' " Charles J. Ingersoll, also for the defendants, "illustrated his position 
with numerous instances": a faithful, honest, industrious colored woman in his employ "un- 
fortunately had a violent temper, and the consequence was that oftentimes the other servants had 
come to him and said they would not stay in the house if he kept her, and many had left because she was retained; and would the Attorney General, he asked, indict all these people?" The defendants were acquitted. 
20. Philadelphia Coal-Heavers, 1836, newspaper items summarized, COMMONS, at 377. "Dur- 
ing a parade of some 200 or 300 coal-heavers who were on strike for a 25 cent increase in their 
daily wages, several were arrested for rioting. . . . The mayor, it was said, in fixing bail 
[$2,500 each] declared that he was determined 'to lay the axe at the root of the Trades' Union.' 
This threat, together with the excessive bail, aroused the Union to action.. . . For the first 
time it admitted unskilled labourers to membership and appointed a committee 'to procure counsel.' A writ of habeas corpus was secured and the labourers were brought before Judge Randall's court for examination. The examination lasted several weeks. 'The Coal Speculators brought up all their 
forces, and several of the respectable gentlemen came themselves to testify against the labourers,' but the court finally decided 'that there was no evidence of a breach of the peace.' The coal dealers then sought to bring charges of conspiracy against the labourers, but here again the court denied that there was ground for an indictment." 
ADDED NOTE 
to be read in connection with note 114a, supra. 
While this article was in press I learned through Professor Norman Ware of a pamphlet 
"Proceedings" of the Shoe and Leather Convention, and examined the copy presented to Presi- dent Tyler, Cong. Lib. HF 2651 B 85 C 7. It is illuminating of the state of tariff feeling which Shaw must have sensed. The convened shoe manufacturers, purporting to speak also for operatives 
between whom and themselves there was "no great or invidious distinction . . . which God grant 
may always be the case," were unanimous in desire for higher duties. There was hot objection 
to concession in the resolutions that international free trade would be ideal; Amasa Walker 
supported the concession on principle; Ebenezer Hussey said that "it meant little or nothing"; 
that free trade is "safe for us to talk about in the abstract, for there is no danger that other 
nations would ever meet us on that common ground." Abbott Lawrence's advocacy of protection 
was enthusiastically received. The memorial to Congress disowned the principle of protection, 
representing revenue as the object of the specific duties asked for, and claiming that they would 
operate as a tax on luxuries, barely, if at all, affecting common articles. Rantoul in his speech 
guardedly conceded that in fixing duties for revenue a sensible Congress would put them where 
they would do the most good. He avoided offence to the convention by avoiding the subject of 
tariff protection; protection he was for-through a sound currency, which would prevent such 
over-expansion of manufactures and glut of importations as an inflated currency stimulates. 
Rantoul's presence indicates that his defence of the Boston bootmakers had made him in- 
fluential in the trade generally. The motion to invite him "to take a seat in the convention" 
had an effect as of saying "check" to the similar invitation to Abbott Lawrence. 
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